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MUSICAL WORK COPYRIGHT FOR THE ERA OF DIGITAL SOUND TECHNOLOGY: 
LOOKING BEYOND COMPOSITION AND PERFORMANCE   
Robert Brauneis∗ 
For over 150 years, copyright law in the United States reflected and 
reinforced the model of music as a two-stage art of composition and 
performance.  Composition – a deliberative activity that allowed rethinking 
and editing – produced a score, a stable, visually perceptible representation of 
melody, harmony and rhythm that used a system of mostly discrete notation.  
A score was realized in performance, a real-time, low-deliberation, no-editing 
activity that was evanescent, unrepeatable, purely aural, and continuous.  
Copyright law protected musical compositions embodied in scores.  It did not 
protect performances.   
Although some musical practices may never have fit this two-stage 
model, the model has faced new challenges from developments in sound 
technologies and their uses by musicians and listeners.  In many genres of 
popular music, written notation is often no longer involved at any stage of 
producing a recording.  Songs are assembled during days of experimentation 
in a rehearsal space or recording studio, and the roles of composer, musician 
and producer are blurred as composition, performance, recording, 
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synthesizing, sequencing, sampling, editing, processing, and mixing are 
accomplished iteratively and collaboratively.  Thus, many songs are now first 
born as recordings, and notated versions of such songs are only 
approximations of the recorded works.  That change in musical practice has 
been accompanied by changes in the use of the word “song” itself. While a 
turn-of-the-twentieth-century “song-plugger” was marketing sheet music, the 
“songs” sold on iTunes are digital files intended to be rendered by electronic 
devices as musical experiences.   
Although the creation of virtually all commercially important music 
still involves some human performance activity, it also typically involves post-
performance splicing, mixing, and  direct electronic modification of sound – in 
effect, composition after performance, a reversal of the traditional order that 
potentially changes the meaning of both activities. In addition, it often 
incorporates synthesized, sequenced sounds that avoid human performance 
and capture of sound through transduction altogether. Thus, although we still 
speak of “recordings,” with that term’s connotation of a faithfully captured 
human performance, most currently produced, commercially important 
popular “recordings” are not viewed by either creators or consumers merely as 
“veridic” or “figurative” representations of performances that occurred at a 
particular time and place.  Rather, they are aesthetic objects in their own 
right, and their creators employ and combine both performance and non-
performance techniques, in various degrees and at various points in the 
production process, to create them.   
The nature of these aesthetic objects is affected by what varies, and 
what remains the same, when the media in which they are fixed are rendered 
as sound in different times and places.  The musical experiences generated by 
digital files and sound equipment can be repeated with much less variation 
across many dimensions than musical experiences in the pre-sound-recording 
era.  Hand a score to two professional musicians, and you will get 
performances that can differ markedly in tempo, articulation, timbres, and so 
on.  Play a digital file on two reasonably good digital players with speakers or 
headphones, and the performances will differ in matters such as overall 
frequency response and reverberation, not in most of the details that would 
vary from musician to musician.  As a result, recordings allow detailed sound 
textures to be finely sculpted and appreciated through successive near-
identical listening experiences. 
While some musical practices thus changed greatly over the century 
after the invention of the phonograph in 1877, recognition of copyrightable 
subject matter under federal copyright law did not.  That law continued to 
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protect only musical scores, and thus ensured that musical composition, as 
the expression of music in scores, occupied a distinct and privileged place in 
the world of legally-protected music.  Not until the 1970s did Congress take 
two legislative actions that cumulatively threw the significance of the score 
into doubt, and raised the issue of how to understand and define musical 
works embedded in sound recordings.   
First, in the Sound Recording Act of 1971,1 Congress extended federal 
copyright protection to a new type of creative work, the sound recording.  
However, the scope of protection for sound recordings was limited, and the 
creation of that limited protection left the distinction between musical 
composition and performance largely in place.  Musical compositions still 
needed to be fixed in scores to gain copyright protection. Once fixed in scores, 
the 1909 Act granted them full reproduction, derivative work, and public 
performance rights, including rights against imitation.2  By contrast, musical 
sound recordings were conceptualized largely as captured performances,3 and 
received more limited protection in two respects.  First, Congress limited the 
scope of reproduction and derivative work rights for sound recordings to 
what in the 1950s and 1960s was called “dubbing”4—mechanical or electronic 
reproduction that is the sonic equivalent of photocopying.  Copyright 
protection for a sound recording thus “do[es] not extend to the making or 
duplication of another sound recording that consists entirely of an 
independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or 
simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording.”5  Second, the Sound 
Recording Act of 1971 did not grant sound recordings a public performance 
right. Thus, whoever counted as an author of a musical work fixed in a score 
was entitled to receive income whenever that work was publicly performed; 
                                                          
1 Sound Recording Act of 1971 § 1, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971). 
2 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(a), 1(b), 1(e) (1909). 
3 The Senate Report to the Sound Recording Act of 1971 does recognize that record 
producers, as well as performers, might be considered authors of sound recordings, 
but it still conceives of the capture of a performance in a recording session as a 
necessary and central act of producing a musical sound recording. Thus, it states that 
authorship might be recognized both “on the part of the performers whose 
performance is captured” and “on the part of the record producer responsible setting 
up the recording session, for capturing and electronically processing the sounds, and 
compiling and editing them to make the final sound recording.” Creation of a Limited 
Copyright in Sound Recordings, S. Rep. No. 92-72, at 5 (April 20, 1971).   
4 See Barbara A. Ringer, The Unauthorized Duplication of Sound Recordings, Study 
No. 26, Studies Prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and 
Copyrights of the Committee of the Judiciary, United States Senate, 86th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (Comm. Print 1961) (study prepared February 1957). 
5 Sound Recording Act of 1971, supra note 1, § 1(a) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1(f) (1909)). 
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whoever counted only as an author of a sound recording fixed in a 
phonorecord was not. 
Five years later, the Copyright Act of 1976 worked a potentially much 
more fundamental change in the conceptualization and protection of musical 
compositions, which it renamed “musical works.”  In the 1976 Act, Congress 
discarded the requirement that musical works be fixed in scores, and instead 
provided that musical works could gain copyright protection even if fixed 
only in phonorecords – that is to say, fixed as sounds in media like magnetic 
tapes, hard drives, optical discs, and silicon chips.  Moreover, Congress 
apparently discarded the musical score requirement retroactively, thereby 
granting copyright protection to many musical works fixed in phonorecords 
but not in scores before the effective dates of either the 1976 Act or the Sound 
Recording Act of 1971.6    
The addition of phonorecords as a means for fixing musical works was 
undoubtedly motivated by the reality that commercial production of music no 
longer necessarily involved scores.  However, such an addition also arguably 
recognizes that a phonorecord-embodied musical work is an aesthetic object 
of a different kind, with different properties, than a notated musical work. 
While notated musical works require human performances for realization, 
phonorecord-embodied musical works, which might also be called “musical 
audio works,” do not require such performances, and hence the 
composition/performance distinction must apply to them differently, if at all.  
Either the entire repeatable listening experience that can be rendered from the 
phonorecord should be recognized as “composition,” and the rendering by an 
electronic or mechanical device should be treated as “performance.” or we 
should recognize that, with the 1976 Act change from “musical composition” 
to “musical work,” the composition/performance distinction may not be 
applicable some musical works at all.  Of course, some musical audio works 
may still be adaptations of notated musical works, but that does not mean 
that every musical audio work is necessarily divided into “composition” and 
“performance” elements, any more than a motion picture, which may be an 
adaptation of a novel, is necessarily divided into literary-work and 
nonliterary-work elements.  
As a proposed interpretation of the 1976 Act, such a view faces a major 
hurdle.  While the 1976 Act newly recognizes the existence of phonorecord-
embodied musical works, it also retains the scheme established in the Sound 
Recording Act of 1971, under which musical works receive full copyright 
                                                          
6 See infra n. 96. 
 5         MUSICAL WORK COPYRIGHT FOR THE ERA OF DIGITAL SOUND TECHNOLOGY 
 
 
 
protection, while sound recordings receive reproduction and derivative work 
rights that are limited to “dubbing,” and no public performance rights at all.7  
If a phonorecord-embodied musical work encompasses the entire repeatable 
listening experience that can be rendered from the phonorecord, then the 
musical work fixed in the phonorecord is coextensive with the sound 
recording fixed in that phonorecord.  That effectively extends rights against 
imitation and public performance rights to the entirety of some sound 
recordings, which is in significant tension with the provisions denying sound 
recordings such rights.  
Yet an approach that seeks to maintain a composition/performance 
distinction within phonorecord-embodied musical works, by separating 
“composition elements” from “performance elements” within those works, 
also faces major difficulties.  Given the history of music copyright, one might 
most naturally look to a score to guide the identification of compositional 
elements within a phonorecord-embodied musical work.  In many cases, 
however, there will be no score available, and even if there is, it is no longer 
clear that a score should be determinative.   
In the face of these difficulties, this article will argue that the better 
course is to cease trying to divide musical sound recordings into composition 
and performance elements.  It will make the case that the 1976 Act could be   
interpreted to require abolition of such a distinction, but it will also argue 
that the Act should be amended if necessary.  An approach that recognizes 
that phonorecord-embodied musical works are distinct from notated musical 
works, and are protectable on their own terms, can potentially better serve 
the purposes of copyright law in at least three ways.  First, such an approach 
would be more consistent with the basic understanding that substantial 
similarity in music is to be evaluated through the comparative aesthetic 
appeal of listening experiences. Second, it would help to enable creators of all 
aspects of those listening experiences to enjoy the incentives and benefits of 
authorship.  Third, it could be a step towards recognition of unitary copyright 
in some musical audio works.    
The Article proceeds in five Parts.  Part I describes the musical work, 
both in practice and in law, before the age of fixed sound, when written 
notation was central.  Part II describes the change in practice wrought by 
developments in sound recording technology, and the birth of a new type of 
                                                          
7 Congress has in the meantime granted sound recordings a limited “digital audio 
transmission right,” see 17 U.S.C. § 106(6), but that right is still significantly narrower 
than the public performance right granted to musical works. 
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aesthetic object, the musical audio work. Through a study of copyright 
registrations, Part III shows how the role of musical notation in creating 
musical works has waned over the last 35 years.  Part IV critically analyzes the 
current legal treatment of musical works embedded in phonorecords, and the 
continued attempts to separate composition elements from performance 
elements.  Part V considers the benefits, drawbacks, and collateral 
consequences of recognizing phonorecord-embodied musical works as 
coextensive with sound recordings.  Part VI provides some brief concluding 
remarks. 
I.  THE MUSICAL WORK IN PRACTICE AND LAW  
IN THE AGE OF THE WRITTEN SCORE 
Throughout history, plenty of music has been made and transmitted 
from generation to generation without written scores.  Musicians working 
within what might be called folk traditions learn music by listening to 
performances and imitating them, often repeatedly with the guidance and 
corrections of a formal or informal teacher, until they have them more-or-less 
fixed in memory.  At another extreme, mechanical musical devices, such as 
music boxes, musical clocks, and mechanical organs, have existed for 
centuries.  Such musical automata make music without any human 
performance at all, and the musical patterns are fixed, not in written notation 
or human memory, but in physical arrangements such as pins placed on a 
barrel or perforations made on a disc.8   
During the nineteenth century and into the early decades of the 
twentieth century, however, the dominant model of musical practice cast 
music as a two-stage art,9  necessarily comprised of two fundamentally 
different activities: composition and performance.  Composition was a 
deliberative activity that allowed rethinking and editing.  Its end product was 
a written score,10 a stable, visually perceptible set of prescriptions for 
musicians to follow.  Scores virtually universally used a system of notation – 
                                                          
8 Even prominent composers such as Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart and Joseph Haydn 
wrote pieces intended for mechanical instruments.  See Alfred Chapuis, The History of 
the Musical Box and of Mechanical Music 59-65 (Joseph E. Roesch, translator 1980). 
9 I have borrowed the phrase “two-stage art” from Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art 
114 (1968). 
10 I use “score” here in its broad musical sense, referring to “a page, volume, fascicle or 
other artefact containing a complete copy of a musical work.”  David Charlton & 
Kathryn Whitney, “Score,” Grove Music Online.  In a narrower sense, a “score” is a 
document in which the music for all instruments and voices in a composition is 
presented together, whereas “parts” are documents in which the music for each 
instrument or voice is presented separately.  See id. 
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Western staff or stave notation – which is mainly discrete: composers choose 
between an F and an F sharp, or between a quarter note and an eighth note, 
instead of setting pitches or durations along a continuum.11  However, staff 
notation typically indicates relative rather than absolute pitch and duration, 
and also gives inexact cues about matters such as dynamics (loudness), 
articulation (legato and staccato rendering of note sequences), timbre, and so 
on. Thus, it leaves room for – and requires – interpretive choices in 
performance. 
Performance contrasts with composition in many respects.  While a 
score is stable and visually perceptible, performance is unrepeatable, 
evanescent, and aural.  While composition is a deliberative process that allows 
for trial-and-error editing, performance is a real-time, low-deliberation, no-
editing activity. 
An investigation into the reasons for the emergence of this 
composition/performance model in musical practice and in law is far beyond 
the scope of this paper, but a few tentative observations may be helpful.  
Musical historians Lydia Goehr and Joseph Kerman, among others, have 
argued that in the nineteenth century, musical practice centered increasingly 
on the concept of the “musical work.”12  In earlier eras, pieces of music were 
more likely to be understood as a part of an event like a church service, as a 
method for presenting a text, or as an act of performance.  Following this 
earlier understanding, Georg Friedrich Händel’s “Music for the Royal 
Fireworks,” for example, would be viewed as analogous to the fireworks show 
that it accompanied on April 27, 1749.13  Both the music and the fireworks 
were planned, and even embodied in a written set of instructions, and the 
designers of both had prominent reputations in their times (the fireworks 
were designed by one Thomas Desguliers).14  Yet both were also constructed 
of elements that could be and were recombined and rearranged to suit various 
occasions, and there was no more thought of cataloguing the music performed 
                                                          
11 For one introduction to musical notation, see Stan Hawkins and John Shepherd, 
“Notation,” in II Continuum Encyclopedia of Popular Music of the World 254 (John 
Shepherd et al., eds., 2003). 
12 See Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the 
Philosophy of Music 176-242 (2007); Joseph Kerman, Contemplating Music: 
Challenges to Musicology   
13 See Wikipedia, “Music for the Royal Fireworks,” 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Music_for_the_Royal_Fireworks . 
14 See id. 
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that day in a Händel-Werke-Verzeichnis15 than there is today in cataloguing 
the fireworks in a Desguliers-Werke-Verzeichnis.   
By contrast, a “work” of music is an autonomous, enduring artistic 
creation that could potentially be deemed a masterpiece and have a place in a 
timeless canon of such works.  Lawrence W. Levine and Olufunmilayo Arewa 
have described the work as arising from a process of “sacralization,” of 
“endow[ing] the music it focused upon with unique aesthetic and spiritual 
properties that rendered it inviolate, exclusive, and eternal.”16  The notion of 
an artistic canon, and the related awareness of history, had arisen earlier in 
literature and in the visual arts, and the emerging concept of musical work 
borrowed from literary and artistic criticism. 
If the rise of the composition/performance model can be linked to 
lofty notions of timeless canons of masterpieces, however, it can also be linked 
to somewhat more earthbound realities of economics, technology, and 
society.17  As printing costs dropped and pianos proliferated in upper-middle 
class parlors around the country, printed musical scores began to play an 
important and profitable role in the dissemination of music into millions of 
homes.  While some of those scores came from the European classical 
tradition, the biggest sellers were sheet music of popular songs, in simple 
arrangements that could be performed by a single amateur pianist-vocalist.  
Most of the music copyright litigation through the middle of the twentieth 
century was about such popular sheet music, and it is fair to say that the 
conception of music copyright held by several generations of judges was 
influenced by sheet music of that type. 
  The emphasis on the score as musical work directed the attention of 
musicians and listeners towards the elements of music that are most easily 
expressed in Western musical notation.  That notation has tended to channel 
music into the twelve tones that it expresses in its basic form, and to focus 
                                                          
15 A catalogue of Händel’s works, published between 1978 and 1986, modeled on earlier 
catalogues of the works of other composers, such as the Köchel-Verzeichnis of 
Mozart’s works, completed in 1862.  See see Wikipedia, “Händel-Werke-Verzeichnis,” 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HWV; Wikipedia, “Köchel catalogue,” 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K%C3%B6chel_catalogue.  
16 See Lawrence W. Levine, High Brow, Low Brow: The Emergence of Cultural 
Hierarchy in America 101 (1988); Olufunmilayo Arewa, Writing Rights: Copyright’s 
Visual Bias and African American Music, at 34-38 (available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2010024 ) 
17 Another article taking the view that the concept of musical work was influenced 
both by aesthetics and the market in sheet music is Jason Toynbee, Copyright, the 
work, and phonographic orality in music, 15 Social and Legal Studies 77, 80-82 (2006). 
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attention on certain structural aspects of music, such as melody and harmony.  
Those discrete tones and structural aspects were given primary status in 
composition, while other aspects of music were largely relegated to the realm 
of the performer, or neglected altogether.  Thus, as Michael Chanan has 
written:  
Western notation deals poorly with certain aspects of musical 
expression, like dynamics, attack, and timbre, which cannot be 
calculated in the same way and given fixed values: their values are 
relative.  At best, therefore, they are indicated by means of codes 
written alongside the stave, which are necessarily approximate and 
suggestive, rather than precise and prescriptive. They do not disappear 
from performance, of course, but notation demotes them, they cease to 
carry any structural significance, and in some cases they are even 
repressed.18 
The emphasis on rough, basic relationships of pitch and timing in a 
memorable sequence of notes – that is to say, on melody – can also be 
appreciated from the perspective of listeners.  Up through the early age of 
sound recordings, people were used to hearing a song performed by many 
different performers, in many different circumstances.  As Elijah Wald puts it, 
what became popular for a few months in the late 1800s and early 1900s was 
not a particular recording, but a song, and the average member of the public 
would hear that song, “at concerts, in vaudeville shoes, on street corners, at 
restaurants, in saloons, or at home around the piano,”19 as well as, in the early 
days of sound recordings, on various scratchy recordings by different 
                                                          
18 Michael Chanan, Musica Practica 5-6 (1994); see Michael Chanan, Repeated Takes: 
A Short History of  Recording and its Effects on Music 10-11 (1995) (describing the 
same phenomenon).  Others who have observed the relationship between musical 
notation and an emphasis on certain elements of music include Olufunmilayo Arewa, 
Paul Théberge, and David Brackett.  See Olufunmilayo Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip 
Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 547, 564, 
625-26 (2006); Paul Théberge, Technology, Creative Practice and Copyright, in Music 
and Copyright (Simon Frith & Lee Marshall eds. 2nd ed. 2004); David Brackett, 
“Music,” in Key Terms in Popular Music and Culture 124, 126 (Bruce Horner & 
Thomas Swiss, eds., 1999).  
19 Elijah Wald, How the Beatles Destroyed Rock ‘n’ Roll: An Alternative History of 
American Popular Music 87 (2009); see Daniela Furini, “From recording performances 
to performing recordings: Recording technology and shifting ideologies of authorship 
in popular music,” TRANS – Transcultural Music Review 14 (Article 10) (2010), 
http://www.sibetrans.com/trans/a11/from-recording-performances-to-performing-
recordings-recording-technology-and-shifting-ideologies-of-authorship-in-popular-
music.   
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performers.  For the most part, what those performances had in common were 
the elements represented in standard musical notation – the song’s melody 
and words – and thus a listener might naturally focus her attention and 
appreciation on those elements.20   
B. The Development of Copyright in Music from 1831 to the 1970s: the Written 
Score and “the Essence of Musical Creation” 
The history of musical copyright in the United States from the first 
explicit acknowledgement of “musical compositions” in 1831 until the changes 
wrought by the Sound Recording Act of 197121 and the Copyright Act of 197622 
reveals two major themes.  First, the musical composition, or musical work, 
was associated very closely with the written score, so much so that for many 
purposes, one could assume that the two were related definitionally – that 
musical works were works created in the language of musical notation, just as 
literary works are works created in written language.  At the same time, 
however, when beginning to consider state-law protection for musical works 
embedded in sound recordings, some courts took an even more restrictive 
view, excluding some elements that are subject to musical notation and 
focusing on basic melodic and harmonic structures. 
1. Federal Copyright and the Musical Work as Score 
In 1831, Congress first recognized “musical compositions” as a 
separate category of copyrightable subject matter under federal law.23  
Although case law had previously established that scores might be federally 
protected as “books,”24 the recognition of musical compositions as distinct 
                                                          
20 In the early era of sound recordings, when amateur musical performance was still 
much more common, a listener’s goal in listening to a sound recording might have 
been to learn the song in order to perform it herself, rather than to appreciate it as an 
aesthetic object.  If that was the goal, then she might have approached the record 
instrumentally, as we approach language instruction recordings today.  We are not 
very picky about who is performing on those language instruction recordings, and we 
may not concentrate on the peculiarities of the performer’s voice, because our goal is 
to speak the language ourselves, not to listen to the recordings for aesthetic pleasure. 
21 Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (Oct. 15, 1971). 
22 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (Oct. 19, 1976). 
23 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, § 1, 4 Stat. 436. 
24 Even before the Copyright Act of 1790 was passed, the Court of King’s Bench had 
decided that copyright under the Statute of Anne, the direct model for the 1790 Act, 
extended to musical scores.  See Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (K.B. 1777).  
Composers registered a variety of musical compositions under the 1790 Act, 
apparently beginning on Februrary 22, 1792 with the registration of “An anthem 
designed for Thanksgiving day – but proper for any publick occasion,” written by one 
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objects of copyright protection lent weight to the notion that notated musical 
works were central to the practice of music. Interestingly, when adding 
protection for music, Congress chose to use more abstract language than it 
ever had previously to describe copyrightable subject matter.  Books, maps, 
charts, and engravings, the objects of federal copyright protection before 1831, 
can all be seen as physical things – copies – rather than, or as well as, 
intangible creations – works.  By contrast, a “musical composition” is a wholly 
intangible object, separate from its embodiment in a musical score.   
Whether the concept of musical composition in copyright law was 
the same as, and stemmed from, the concept of musical work in nineteenth-
century aesthetics – the work as autonomous, enduring artistic creation – is a 
matter of some disagreement between scholars.  Lydia Goehr assumes that the 
legal concept sprang from the aesthetic concept,25 and Jason Toynbee, while 
recognizing material and technological as well as aesthetic determinants of 
the concept, also contends that it was formed outside the law and then 
assimilated into it.26  By contrast, Anne Barron argues that the legal concept of 
musical work emerged before the aesthetic concept, out of common-law 
property reasoning, and in particular out of a shift from physicalism to 
formalism in that reasoning; the legal concept, she argues, is at least partially 
independent of the aesthetic concept and has a different focus.27   
If “musical composition” is an abstract concept, however, there is no 
doubt that copyright law and practice identified the musical composition 
with the printed musical score.  From 1790 through 1977, federal copyright 
protection for musical compositions could be obtained only through fixation 
                                                                                                                                            
William Cooper. See Federal Copyright Records 1790-1800, 77 (1987).  In 1829, U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Smith Thompson, riding circuit and looking to English law as 
a source for American law, declared that “[i]t seems to be well settled in England, that 
a literary production, to be entitled to the protection of the statute on copyrights . . . 
may be printed on one sheet, as the words of a song or the music accompanying it.”  
Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1000-01 (Cir. Ct. S.D.N.Y. 1829).  On the development of 
copyright protection for music in England, see Michael Carroll, The Struggle for 
Music Copyright, 57 Fla. L. Rev. 907 (2005); Nancy A. Mace, Litigating the Musical 
Magazine: The Definition of British Music Copyright in the 1780s, 2 Book History 122 
(1999). 
25 Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the 
Philosophy of Music 218-219 (2007). 
26 See Jason Toynbee, Copyright, the work, and phonographic orality in music, 15 
Social and Legal Studies 77 (2006). 
27  See Anne Barron, Introduction: Harmony or Dissonance? Copyright Concepts and 
Musical Practice, 15 Social & Legal Studies 25, 46-47 (2006); Anne Barron, Copyright 
Law’s Musical Work, 15 Social & Legal Studies 101, 118-122 (2006). 
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in, and publication of, musical scores.  The deposit of musical scores with the 
government, a requirement of copyright protection until 1909, continued to be 
a requirement of filing infringement suits until 1978.   
Although mechanical reproduction of music gained increased 
significance in the late nineteenth century, several federal court decisions, 
culminating in the Supreme Court decision in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. 
Apollo Company28 in 1908, reaffirmed the centrality of the score.  Those decisions 
all concerned the question of whether mechanical devices that made music 
could infringe copyright in musical compositions.  In answering that question 
in the negative, however, the decisions took for granted, and reinforced, the 
principle that copyright protection would only be granted to musical 
compositions on the basis of their embodiment in scores, not in mechanical 
devices.  Moreover, the score was understood to be defined by its role in the 
“two-stage art” model of musical practice.  Scores had to be readable by 
musicians, because human performances were considered to be the integral 
second stage of the production of music.  Perforated rolls did not count as 
scores because they were “not intended to be read as an ordinary piece of 
sheet music, which, to those skilled in the art, conveys, by reading, in playing 
or singing, definite impressions of the melody.”29  Thus under the rule of White-
Smith, scores capable of being read by musicians were necessary both for the 
protection of musical compositions, and for the infringement of the 
reproduction and distribution rights in those compositions.      
With regard to infringement, the Copyright Act of 1909 overturned 
the White-Smith holding by granting the owners of copyright in musical 
compositions a right to royalties from mechanical equipment that could 
produce performances of those works. 30  However, under the 1909 Act, one 
could still only obtain federal copyright protection of a musical composition 
by publication of visually perceptible copies of that composition with proper 
copyright notice, or in the case of unpublished works, by registration 
accompanied by deposit of a visually perceptible copy.31  The public 
                                                          
28 209 U.S. 1 (1908).  Earlier lower court cases included Kennedy v. McTammany, 33 
Fed. 584 (D. Mass. 1888) (piano rolls), and Stern v. Rosey, 17 App. D. C. 562 (1901) 
(phonograph cylinders). 
29 White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 18. 
30 See 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1909 Act).  The 1909 Act also protected dramatic compositions 
against mechanical devices that could render performances. 
31 As for unpublished works, the Copyright Act of 1909 provided that “Copyright may 
also be had of the works of an author of which copies are not reproduced for sale, by 
the deposit, with claim of copyright, of one complete copy of such work if it be a . . . 
musical composition . . . .” Act of March 4, 1909, § 11.  As for published works, there 
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distribution of phonograph records embodying a performance of a musical 
composition could not result in the acquisition of federal copyright in that 
composition, even if the records displayed copyright notice for the musical 
composition.32   
Further reinforcing the identification of musical composition with 
score, the Copyright Office registered musical compositions only on the basis 
of the deposit of written scores.  As the 1970 Compendium of Copyright Office 
Practices put it, “[a] sound recording of a musical composition is not 
acceptable for registration in Class E [covering musical compositions]. When 
a sound recording is deposited, the Office will reject the claim but point out to 
the applicant the possibility of writing out the composition in manuscript 
form and then making registration on the basis of the manuscript.”33  Such a 
                                                                                                                                            
appear to be no cases holding squarely that visually perceptible copies were required, 
but there are certainly no cases granting relief to authors of musical works that were 
not fixed in such copies, and the commentators seem to agree unanimously that 
visually perceptible copies were necessary to obtain federal copyright.  See 1 Melville 
B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 4.05[B][1] (“[S]ale of records 
did not divest statutory rights in the recorded work if prior to public distribution of 
the records, a statutory copyright had been obtained either by publishing printed copies 
of the work bearing a proper copyright notice, or by depositing an unpublished 
manuscript of the work in the Copyright Office.”) (emphasis added); Benjamin Kaplan, 
Publication in Copyright Law: The Question of Phonograph Records, 103 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 469, 482-83 (1955) (“[I]t is very doubtful whether the Code admits of obtaining 
copyright through the medium of a phonograph record as distinguished from a paper 
with notations. . . . A labored argument can be made against the grain of the statute for 
accepting records for this purpose.”). 
32 Thus, public distribution of what we now call phonorecords could not count as an 
“investive publication” of a musical composition, resulting in the acquisition of federal 
copyright.  Could it count as a “divestive publication,” resulting in the forfeiture of 
federal copyright?  Inconsistent court rulings on that issue persisted into the 1990s, 
until Congress amended the Copyright Act in 1997 to provide that distribution of 
phonorecords under the 1909 Act would never count as publication, investive or 
divestive, of a musical composition.  See “An Act to make technical amendments to 
certain provisions of Title 17, United States Code,” Act of Nov. 13, 1997, Pub. L. 105-80, 
§ 11, 111 Stat. 1529, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 303(b) (providing that “[t]he distribution 
before January 1, 1978, of a phonorecord shall not for any purpose constitute a 
publication of the musical work embodied therein”); ABKCO Music, Inc. v. LaVere, 217 
F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that Congress intended the amendment to be 
retroactively applied to a case in which the District Court had decided before 
enactment of the amendment that distribution of a phonorecord had published the 
underlying musical work). 
33 U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium of Copyright Office Practices (As of July 1, 
1970) (hereinafter “Compendium I”)  2.6.2 II. “Sound Recordings Not Acceptable,” at 
p. 2-33.  See U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium of Copyright Office Practices (1984) 
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manuscript did not need to “employ the conventional form of music notation,” 
but it did need to be “intelligible and capable of being read and visually 
perceived.”34  This was because to be counted as a “musical composition,” a 
“work must generally contain notations representing a succession of musical 
sounds, usually in some definite melodic and rhythmic pattern.”35  Because an 
owner of copyright in a work had to register and deposit copies of the work 
before filing an infringement suit,36 in every infringement suit the plaintiff’s 
musical composition was represented by a notated, visually perceptible 
manuscript. 
2. Melody, Harmony, Rhythm and “the Essence of Musical Creation” 
The identification of musical work with written score, and with 
Western staff notation in particular, might focus attention on some elements 
of music, and hinder consideration of others.  In practice, Western staff 
notation is not a closed, narrow set of symbols limited to the designation of 
pitches and durations, but a richer set of symbols that composers supplement 
as they see fit with words and newly defined symbols, which can  express 
instructions concerning such matters as dynamics, articulation, tone color, 
and microtonal variation.37  However, some language in cases decided under 
the Copyright Act of 1909 or under state common law seems to express a more 
restrictive view of what count as elements of a musical work. 
  Part of the explanation is likely that almost all of the music 
infringement cases handled by courts in the era of the 1909 Act written 
                                                                                                                                            
(known as “Compendium II”) § 405.01(a) (“Copies required before 1978. Until 1978, a 
copy was the only form in which a musical work could be accepted for registration.); 
Edward A. Sargoy, UCC Protection in the United States: The Coming into Effect of 
the Universal Copyright Convention, 33 N.Y.U. 811, 850 n. 50 (1958) (“It has been the 
accepted practice in the Copyright Office, and in the profession, since the present law 
was enacted in 1909, not to register claims to copyright under Title 17 in works in 
exclusively acoustic form (either as to intellectual content, or rendition);  Testimony 
of Edward P. Murphy, Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the 
House Judiciary Committee, Hearings on Pre-1978 Distribution of Recordings 
Containing Musical Compositions; Copyright Term Extension; and Copyright Per 
Program Licenses, Serial No. 39, at 19 (June 27, 1997). 
34 Compendium I, supra n. 8, 2.6.2 I. “Conventional notation not necessary,” at p. 2-32. 
35 Compendium I, supra n. 8, 2.6.1. “What are musical compositions.” I. “Generally,” at 
p. 2-23. 
36 See 17 U.S.C. § 13 (1909) (“No action or proceeding shall be maintained for 
infringement of copyright in any work until the provisions of this title with respect to 
the deposit of copies and registration of such work shall have been complied with.”).   
37 For examples of notation concerning timbre, see note xx infra; for examples of 
notation of microtones, see note xx infra. 
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notation requirement concern popular songs that were notated in the form of 
sheet music arranged sparsely for piano and voice.  In the 1924 case of Fred 
Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham,38 for example, the two works at issue, the plaintiffs’ 
“Dardanella” and the defendant’s “Ka-Lu-A,” had both been published in such 
arrangements, and the allegedly infringed and infringing portions of those 
works were both left-hand piano figures written in the bass clef, in the key of 
C major, in 2/2 time, repeating once per measure.  In such cases, there was 
little complexity to discuss.  Once music began to be marketed through 
records, record companies began to obtain federal copyright protection by 
registering compositions as unpublished works in even simpler form, as lead 
sheets that contained only a melodic line.  For example, in the 1952 case of 
Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Distributing Co.,39 the court notes that “[t]he 
copyrighted sheet [of the plaintiff’s musical composition, a song called 
‘Tonight He Sailed Again,’ registered in 1944,] indicated only the melodic line; 
the published copy issued in early 1948 indicated the harmony.”40 When the 
compositions at issue in the cases were as thin as that, courts had no occasion 
to dwell on matters other than rhythm, harmony, and melody, because the 
notations contained little or nothing else.  Thus, in many of the cases in which 
courts articulated a definition of musical works in terms of a finite list of 
elements, they were not rejecting other elements proposed by one of the 
parties; rather, they were simply articulating what they were used to seeing in 
thinly notated sheet music or lead sheets. 
That explanation is not complete, however, because at least one key 
decision appears to consider and reject other elements.  That decision, issued 
in 1950 by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California in 
Supreme Records v. Decca Records,41 concerns the tangled issue of common-law 
copyright in musical elements or features that appeared in the plaintiff’s 
sound recording but did not form part of a federally copyrighted notated 
composition, foreshadowing similar issues that would later arise under the 
Copyright Act of 1976.   In the legislative history of the Sound Recording Act 
of 1971 and the Copyright Act of 1976, Supreme Records is referred to as the “so-
called ‘mirror recording’ case,42 and is characterized as precedent for the lack 
                                                          
38 298 F. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) .    
39 105 F.Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). 
40 Id. at 396. 
41 90 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. Cal. 1950). 
42 See Copyright Law Revision Part III, page 196 (comments of Sydney A. Diamond, 
London Records) (meeting of April 11, 1963); see also id. at 75 (referring to “mirror 
copying”) (comments of Leon Kellman, American Guild of Authors and Composers). 
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of protection for sound recordings against independently fixed imitations, 
now codified in § 114(b) of the Copyright Act.   
In dicta, at least, the Supreme Records opinion is not quite so categorical.  
It also speculates that an unnotated musical arrangement might be protected 
against misappropriation, if it rose to the level of “musical creation”: 
Assuming that a common-law property right may be asserted to the 
arrangement in a recorded song, distinct from the right to the song 
itself, in order that a particular arrangement be given recognition as 
such, the elements which the recorder has introduced must involve 
creative ability of a distinct kind. Adding certain incidents, such as 
emphasis upon accent, which is all that the clapping does, does nothing 
to the essence of musical creation. Musical creation consists in the 
grouping of notes, similarity of bars, harmony or melody. . . . Accent is 
important. But accent alone does not rise to the dignity of creation.43 
It is a little difficult to know how to approach this passage, particularly 
because although the court mentions clapping and accent as if they were the 
only elements at issue in the case, the court actually rejects the plaintiff’s 
claims concerning many more copied elements, including the addition of a 
group of male singers singing lyrics and a melody that did not appear in the 
copyrighted sheet music.44  One interpretation of the passage, however, is that 
“accent” simply forms no part of the copyrightable content of music.  This 
interpretation recalls the notorious statement, appearing two years later in 
the Northern Music Corp. case, that rhythm and harmony are uncopyrightable, 
leaving only melody as the basis for musical copyright:  
There is only a limited amount of tempos; these appear to have been 
long since exhausted; originality of rhythm is a rarity, if not an 
impossibility. Harmony is the blending of tones; this is achieved 
according to rules which have been known for many years. Being in the 
public domain for so long neither rhythm nor harmony can in itself be 
the subject of copyright. . . . It is in the melody of the composition—or 
the arrangement of notes or tones that originality must be found. 45  
                                                          
43 Id. at 912-913. 
44 For more detail on the Supreme Records case, see the online note at 
http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/rbrauneis/musicalworkcopyright/supremerecords.ht
m. 
45 Northern Music Corp., 105 F.Supp. at 400.  For another view from the 1950s that is 
somewhat similar in nature but takes the opposite position, see Paul W. Orth, The 
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The Northern Music Corp. statement has been roundly criticized by 
commentators46 and has not been followed in subsequent cases. The Supreme 
Records statement about accent, interpreted as a categorical rejection of it 
forming any part of a copyrightable musical work, likely deserves the same 
fate.  Both statements fail to recognize that copyright protects a musical work 
as a whole – as a complex assemblage of many individual elements – and that 
the choice to combine a particular rhythm with melodies, harmonies, and the 
like can render the rhythm an element of the protected work, even if the 
composer copied the rhythm from another source.47  This insight is of course 
not limited to music, but is equally applicable to all types of copyrighted 
works.48 
 As a matter of history, however, Supreme Records and Northern Music 
Corp. do have their place. During the era that federal copyright required 
fixation of musical works in written notation, the legal concept of the musical 
work was certainly limited to the elements represented in that notation, and 
excluded elements that were added in performance.  In addition, in some 
cases, it was even more narrowly conceived to exclude elements thought to be 
common and limited in number, or incidental or characteristically left to the 
discretion of performers. 
II.   FROM THE SOUND RECORDING TO THE MUSICAL AUDIO WORK:  
NEW TECHNOLOGY AND NEW ART 
                                                                                                                                            
Use of Experts in Musical Infringement Cases, 16 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 232, 234 (1955) 
(“Since most if not all melodies hark back to old times, serious composers strike out in 
fields of harmony or rhythm (or lack of it).”). 
46 See, e.g. Aaron Keyt, An Improved Framework for Music Plagiarism Litigation, 76 
Cal. L. Rev. 421, 431 (1988) (characterizing the quotation as “unfortunately, not 
atypical of the way judges write about music”). 
47 The Northern Music Co. statement suffers from other defects as well.  It appears to 
adopt a patent-like view of originality, which would deny protection to any feature 
that could be found in the prior art of music, whether or not the plaintiff was aware of 
its prior appearance and copied or not.  That view conflicts with established 
copyright doctrine.  It also conflates tempo with rhythm, though they are in music 
theory two different things. 
48 See, e.g., Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001) (“In applying this [more 
discerning ordinary observer] test, a court is not to dissect the works at issue into 
separate components and compare only the copyrightable elements. . . . [That] would 
result in almost nothing being copyrightable because original works broken down 
into their composite parts would usually be little more than basic unprotectible 
elements like letters, colors and symbols.”). 
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 We now turn to the developments in audio technology that began 
with wax cylinders and have led to sophisticated digital audio production 
software.  This Part will seek to emphasize four points related to those 
developments.  First, the development of equipment that is able to repeatedly 
render fine-grained, high-quality audio can be correlated with a shift in 
creative emphasis in a variety of musical genres.  Much music that is created 
with audio playback in mind places less emphasis on the formal structures 
and scale-ordered pitches of written notation, and more emphasis on details 
like tone color, spatial effects, and microtones that fall in between the notes of 
a musical scale.  Second, the enduring fascination with the apparent ability to 
transcend the flow of time by capturing and replaying fleeting audio reality 
has masked the fact that the “sound recordings” that currently constitute the 
bulk of popular music production are carefully constructed fictional audio 
experiences rather than faithfully captured performances.  Third, “songs” are 
now often produced without the use of musical notation in layers of human 
performance, alteration and combination of such performances, and 
programming of sequenced sounds that avoid human performance altogether, 
and in collaborations that blur traditional roles of composer, performer, 
producer, and engineer.   Statistical analysis of copyright registrations at the 
U.S. Copyright Office demonstrates that creators of music have decisively 
moved away from notation, and towards simultaneous registration of a 
“musical work” and a “sound recording” on the basis of a single phonorecord 
deposit. 
A.  Repeatability, Manipulability, and the Appreciation of Sonic Detail 
 In his book Capturing Sound,49 Mark Katz has explored the variety of 
reactions to the repeatability of sonic experience in great detail.  This Part will 
focus on only one of those reactions.  Katz begins by asking the reader to 
engage in a simple experiment: 
Sing a single note. Now try to recreate that sound exactly—not simply 
its pitch, but its precise volume, length, intensity, timbre, attack, and 
decay.  Now imagine trying to repeat an entire song in this way, down 
to the smallest detail.  It simply cannot be done.50   
Yet what cannot be accomplished by human performers can, with a much 
greater degree of accuracy and with much greater detail, be accomplished by 
sound technologies developed over the last century-and-a-half.  Such 
                                                          
49 Mark Katz, Capturing Sound: How Technology Has Changed Music (rev. ed. 2010). 
50 Id. at 29. 
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technologies have enabled the production of repeatable listening experiences, 
and advances in those technologies have made possible ever more detailed and 
nuanced repeatable sound experiences, created through precise manipulation 
of sonic details.  To be sure, a recording played over an AM car radio does not 
sound “the same” as that recording played on high-end equipment in a studio.  
But even those two different renderings preserve many details that would not 
be preserved in two live performances by the same performer, let alone by two 
different performers. 
 Such repeatability enables the appreciation of sonic nuances that are 
difficult to appreciate with a single hearing.  The ability to manipulate and 
adjust such nuances, and to compare and contrast slightly different versions 
before selecting one, enables creative focus on those details in a way that live 
performance does not. To say that the development of sound technologies has 
therefore caused a change in the musical elements emphasized in some 
musical genres would be to commit to a debatable technological determinism.  
Without making such a commitment, however, we can trace a correlation 
between sound technologies and a shift in creative emphasis in the genres that 
form the bulk of commercially distributed music.  As Theodore Gracyk has 
argued, 
[A]pprehension of formal composition is hardly the primary attraction 
when listening and relistening to most rock music.  Most of the rock 
audience shuns compositional complexity, either horizontally or 
vertically.  In terms of traditional (syntactical) musical analysis, most 
rock music is simple and repetitive and predictable.51   
Instead, he contends, rock music has come to place primary emphasis on 
timbre or tone color: 
Rock is a music of very specific sound qualities and their textural 
combination.  Specific sounds are as central to the music as are specific 
colors in painting. . . . Employing recording as their primary medium, 
rock musicians have become painterly.  But not neo-classical painters 
like Jean Ingres and Jacques-Louis David, who insisted that color is 
                                                          
51 Theodore Gracyk, Rhythm and Noise 57 (1996). The reuse of basic chord changes 
has inspired at least one wickedly funny sketch, in which the Australian group Axis of 
Awesome performs excerpts of 36 popular songs using the same four chords.  See Axis 
of Awesome, “Four Chord Song,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5pidokakU4I . 
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subordinate to line and drawing.  They are painters in the tradition of 
Eugène Delacroix, for whom color is the essence of the art.52 
Consider, for example, the Beatles’ recording of “A Hard Day’s Night.”  
Analyses by John Stevens53 and Alan W. Pollack54 show that the song has 
some melodic and harmonic originality; they also show that the song has a 
traditional 12-bar blues, AABA structure, and that it has nowhere near the 
theme-and-variations complexity that would be found in a piece by Bach or 
Mozart.  But what may set the recording apart, more than any other feature, is 
the opening chord, a stunning sonic experience.55  Musicians have debated for 
decades how to best analyze that chord, and officially published 
transcriptions have fallen woefully short of enabling performers to duplicate 
it. In 2004, Jason Brown, a mathematician at Dalhousie University, did an 
analysis of the sound recording using a mathematical operation called a 
Fourier Transform.  It revealed that the chord was composed of 48 frequencies 
that exceeded a certain amplitude threshold.  Brown then speculated about 
how each frequency was generated, and concluded that in addition to the two 
guitars, bass and drum played by the members of the Beatles, some of the 
frequencies were likely generated by George Martin playing piano.56  A video 
more recently posted on YouTube adds that the sustain pedal of the piano was 
likely pressed, allowing the unplayed strings of the piano to vibrate 
sympathetically with the pitches generated by the other instruments, and that 
the frequencies below 100 Hertz were filtered out to prevent “muddiness” in 
                                                          
52 Id. at 61, 66.  For other similar observations, see, e.g., David Brackett, “Music,” in 
B.Horner & T. Swiss, Key Terms in Popular Music and Culture 126 (1999) (“most 
recent popular music…generates its musical interest through subtle inflections of 
rhythm, pitch, and tone colour within a repetitive formal frame work”); Lionel Bently, 
Authorship of popular music in UK copyright law, 12 Information, Communication & 
Society 179 (2009); Aaron Keyt, An Improved Framework for Music Plagiarism 
Litigation, supra note 41, at 432 (“Since the 1950s, popular songs have moved beyond 
an exclusive focus on melody, chords, and lyrics, to a more imaginative use of rhythm, 
phrasing, bass lines, instrumentation and new technological effects, all of which can 
play an important role in a song’s originality.”); Daniel J. Levitin, This is Your Brain on 
Music 52 (2006) (describing the revelation that “[t]imbre was what defined rock”). 
53 See John Stevens, Hard Day’s Night – The Beatles – Musical Analysis, 
http://www.berkleeshares.com/songwriting__arranging/hard_days_night_beatles_mus
ic_analysis. 
54 See Alan W. Pollack, Notes on “A Hard Day’s Night,” 
http://www.icce.rug.nl/~soundscapes/DATABASES/AWP/ahdn.shtml  
55 To see a video that presents the chord and an analysis that is consistent with Jason 
Brown’s as described below, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2wbNaEXmyrw. 
56 See Jason I. Brown, Mathematics, Physics, and A Hard Day’s Night, Canadian 
Mathematical Society Notes 36 (2004), 4-8, available at 
http://www.mscs.dal.ca/~brown/n-oct04-harddayjib.pdf.  
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the sound.57  The result is a complex sound that is instantly recognizable by 
many people as the sound of the Beatles. 
Tone color and complex harmonies are not the only details brought 
into the aesthetic foreground by recording; so are notes outside of the 
traditional 12-note Western scale, as two quite different examples show.  
First, as Michael Chanan recounts, Bela Bartok’s experience with quarter-tone 
inflections in eastern European and Mediterranean music “became a major 
influence on his own style of composition.  On Bartok’s own admission, 
recording played a seminal role in reawakening his hearing to the presence 
and significance of these various subtle powers of expression.”58  Second, as 
Olufunmilayo Arewa has written,59 recordings of blues musicians have raised 
aesthetic awareness of the use of microtones within that tradition.  Joseph L. 
Monzo has undertaken a careful analysis of Robert Johnson’s vocals on his 
recording of “Drunken Hearted Man,”60 and through the use of expanded staff 
notation and two other types of charts, he   visually represents how Johnson 
departs from equal-tempered pitches in his vocals.61  Of course, microtonal 
blues singing also was and is passed down between musicians through live 
performance and training. However, the repeated listening enabled by 
recording does allow for a kind of appreciation and analysis that is impossible 
when listening to fleeting live vocals a single time.62   And, of course, 
recordings do enable people widely separated in space and time – such as Eric 
Clapton and Keith Richards, who learned of Johnson’s work on the other side 
of the Atlantic Ocean long after Johnson had died – to learn of and imitate 
unnotated elements.  
                                                          
57 See supra note 48. 
58 Michael Chanan, Repeated Takes: A Short History of Recording and Its Effects on 
Music 11 (1997). 
59 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Blues Lives: Promise and Perils of Musical Copyright, 27 
Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 573 (2010). 
60 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hbwLznhwIQ8 
61 See Joseph L. Monzo, Uses of Microtones in the Vocals of Robert Johnson, 
http://sonic-arts.org/monzo/rjohnson/drunken.htm. 
62 See, e.g., Theodore Gracyk, supra n. 42, at 55 (“Like every aspiring rock musician, 
{John] Fogerty studied his favorite recordings and ‘memorized every note.’  In doing 
so, the ‘edge’ and ’size’ of the sound were absorbed along with the notes played.”); Rob 
Bowman, “The determining role of performance in the articulation of meaning: the 
case of ‘Try a Little Tenderness,’” in Analyzing Popular Music 125, 129 (Allan F. 
Moore, ed. 2003) (“For the last one hundred years or so we have lived in a society 
where recordings have become the primary means both of dissemination and learning 
of music. This is oral culture as process where nuances such as timbral variation, 
rhythmic articulation, pitch gesture and arrangements are at least as, if not more, 
important than lyrics, chord progression and melody.”). 
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B.  From Faithful Capture of Aural Reality to Aural Fictions 
 Jonathan Sterne has argued in his book The Audible Past63 that the 
technology of sound recording did not just neutrally spring forth, but became 
possible only when people started to imagine an audible past that could and 
should be preserved.  Such an imagination was surely connected with the 
imagination of the visible past, and with the belief that photography, 
developed before phonography, enabled unmediated preservation of fleeting 
moments in the visible world.  As William H.F. Talbot put it, writing in 1839, 
photography was a “process by which natural objects may be made to 
delineate themselves, without the aid of an artist’s pencil.”64  In the last 
decades of the nineteenth century, Thomas Edison, Alexander Graham Bell, 
Emile Berliner, and others all became interested in developing a means by 
which sound could similarly engrave itself on a durable medium, and spring 
forth from those engravings at a later time.  Thus, they all worked on 
implementing principles of transduction – the conversion of acoustical energy 
into mechanical or electronic energy65 – to create stable physical 
configurations like wavy grooves that could be reconverted into acoustical 
energy through transduction in the opposite direction.  Machines that 
implemented those principles became known as phonographs (Thomas 
Edison’s term) or gramophones (Emile Berliner’s term).   
As phonograph records entered commerce, that is how they were sold 
– as mirrors of aural reality that could preserve sound from a particular place 
and time.  Francois Barraud’s painting “His Master’s Voice,”66 used extensively 
as a trademark for both the Victor Talking Machine Company in the United 
States and the Gramophone Company in England, pushes the sales pitch into 
the realm of the macabre.  In that painting, a dog – an animal known to have 
an acute sense of hearing – is sitting entranced at the mouth of a gramophone 
horn.  Issuing forth from the horn is the voice of his master, even though, in 
                                                          
63 See Jonathan Sterne, The Audible Past: Cultural Origins of Sound Reproduction 
(2003). 
64 William H.F. Talbot, Some Account of the Art of Photogenic Drawing, or the 
Process by Which Natural Objects May Be Made to Delineate Themselves Without 
the Aid of an Artist’s Pencil, Royal Society of London, Jan 31, 1839; see Christine Haight 
Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright’s Response to the Invention of 
Photography, 65 U. Pa. L. Rev. 385, 395-402 (2004). For a parallel story of how 
western literature moved towards naturalism, see Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The 
Representation of Reality in Western Literature (1953). 
65 On transduction and transducers, see Jay Hodgson, Understanding Records: A Field 
Guide to Recording Practice 2 – 3 (2010); Jonathan Sterne, The Audible Past: Cultural 
Origins of Sound Reproduction 22 (2003). 
66 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:His_Master%27s_Voice.jpg. 
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the story that Barraud intended to portray, his master is dead.  The 
gramophone could thus not just freeze time, but magically bridge the gulf 
between life and death. 
If the early phonographs were hardly perfect mirrors, the imaginative 
hold of representing aural reality continued, and improvements in technology 
were typically portrayed as enabling better representation.  Thus, various 
improvements after World War II were marketed as producing not just a 
wider variety of sound frequencies, but “high fidelity” – reproduction that was 
more faithful to aural reality.  Stereophonic sound reproduction was 
developed and marketed, not just to provide interesting spatial effects, but as 
a recreation of the directionality and aural perspective of natural hearing.  
Mercury Records, for example, released its stereo “Perfect Presence Sound 
Series,” RCA its “Living Stereo” recordings, Elektra its “Panoramic Stereo” 
LPs.67  As the narration to a 1957 advertising film by RCA put it – with a 
performance of Tchaikovsky’s Romeo and Juliet by Charles Munch and the 
Boston Symphony in the background – “almost every home music lover is in 
search of the same thing: the truest, most lifelike reproduction of the original 
music possible . . . or . . . perfect fidelity.”68 
Writers have used a number of different terms to describe recordings 
within this model.  John Andrew Fisher calls such recordings “veridic,” 
because they try to be “true-to-performance.” 69  Virgil Moorefield has 
described such recordings as “figurative,” in the sense that, like figurative art, 
they purport to represent something in the world, in this instance a musical 
performance. 70  He has also said that recording’s metaphor is one of “mimetic 
space,” in which the object is to give an “illusion of reality.”71  Theodore 
Gracyk has used the phrase “recording realism” to name the view that “any 
                                                          
67 See the display of banners from stereo LP covers at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Stereo_Stack-A_kaleidoscopic-wonderland_of_hi-
fidelity_and_dual-dynamic_vibrancy.jpg 
68 See RCA Victor, “How to Listen to  . . . New Dimensions in Sound” (1957), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ziMw7uh9VNo.  Some readers will recall that in 
the 1970s and 1980s, Memorex had a television and print advertising campaign that 
used the tagline “Is it live, or is it Memorex?,” thus carrying on the tradition of 
marketing sound recording as faithful capture. 
69 See John Andrew Fisher, “Rock ‘n’ Recording: The Ontological Complexity of Rock 
Music,” in Musical Worlds: New Directions in the Philosophy of Music 108, 115 (P. 
Alperson, Ed., 1998). 
70 See Virgil Moorefield, The Producer as Composer: Shaping the Sounds of Popular 
Music 29 (2005) (contending that from Revolver onwards, the Beatles “dispensed with 
the concept of realism or what could be called ‘figurative’ recording”). 
71 Id. at xiii. 
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mechanical recording is essentially the documentation of some independent 
reality.”72  William Moylan has used the metaphor of transparency, noting 
that in this model, “[t]he recording medium is . . . called upon to be 
transparent.”73  The aim of recordings in this model, states Albin Zak, is to be 
a “transparent documentary representation.”74 
 The language that we have to speak of works that are to be rendered 
by machines as sound sequences is still heavily influenced by the imagination 
of a transparent window into an aural past.  It is difficult, in ordinary 
conversation as in law, to avoid words like “recording,” with its connotation 
of documenting aural reality. Yet from the very beginning of the “recording 
industry,” musicians and technicians worked to create a product that was  
pleasing to the ear, even though the musicians had to alter their live 
performance style when making a recording,75 and even though the playback 
did not recreate the experience of being present at a live musical performance.  
At first, these deviations from live performance practice and result could be 
explained away as stemming from the imperfection of transduction 
technologies.  The goal, one could argue, was still a perfect representation of a 
live performance; musicians had to change performance styles in order to 
simulate live sound in the face of imperfect capture and playback, and if the 
playback still wasn’t perfect, that was just the result of technological 
shortcomings. 
Beginning largely in the 1950s, however, most popular music has 
steadily and consciously moved away from the model of transparent 
recordings of real-time performances.  The recording, or audio work, has 
become a focus of creative effort and unit of creative production in its own 
right.  People who produce recordings think much less in terms of transparent 
presentations of musical performances, and more in terms of collections and 
sequences of sound that exhibit some set of desired qualities: they are 
consonant or dissonant, regular or jagged, soothing or grating, crooning or 
wailing. Correlatively, most members of the audience for popular music do not 
expect or desire authenticity and transparency in a sound recording; they 
recognize that recordings are largely opaque stews of musical sound, and are 
                                                          
72 See Theodore Gracyk, Rhythm and Noise 39 (1996). 
73 See William Moylan, The Art of Recording: The Creative Resources of Music 
Production and Audio 81 (1992). 
74 See Albin J. Zak III, The Poetics of Rock: Cutting Tracks, Making Records 7 (2001). 
75 On such alterations, see Mark Katz, Capturing Sound: How Technology Changed 
Music 42-45 (2010). 
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interested in sonic experiences in their own right.76  Third, the process by 
which recordings are made, although varying, has typically come to involve 
little or no reliance on written scores, and far more editing and manipulation 
of real-time human musical performances (and sometimes avoidance of real-
time performances altogether). 
There are many milestones in the evolution from captured 
performance to audio work.  Theodore Gracyk contends that the best 
candidate for time and place of the birth of “the rock aesthetic of creativity 
through recording” was 1954 at Sun Studios in Memphis, when Elvis Presley, 
with producer Sam Phillips, guitarist Scotty Moore, and bassist Bill Black, 
made recordings such as “Good Rockin’ Tonight,”77 “Mystery Train,”78 and 
“That’s Alright Mama.”79  That aesthetic had implications for both process and 
product.  As for process, Dave Marsh has written: 
Elvis, Scotty, Bill and Sam built their music in the recording studio, the 
first time anyone had ever created a major musical innovation except by 
working it out in front of a live audience or by laboriously composing it 
on paper first.  Magnetic recording tape had only recently made it 
possible to do a take of a song, listen to a playback, analyze it, then try 
another rendition and repeat the process.80    
Listening to the playback did not just mean hearing where a note was played 
too long or sung too sharp and should be corrected.  It meant listening to the 
playback as sound, and concentrating on sculpting the sound of the finished 
product.  Concentration on that sound led to experimentation both with 
reverberation or “reverb,” and with progressively more complicated echo 
effects.  Sam Phillips installed a specially-wired two-tape-recorder setup that 
created an echo or “slap-back”81 by mixing the initial recording with the 
                                                          
76 To be sure, authenticity has been a major theme in twentieth-century popular music 
as well, and it has sometimes surfaced in the form of a desire for recordings that are 
veridic representations of “authentic” live performances.  However, authenticity is a 
much more complex and variable concept, which includes authenticity as emotional 
autobiography and authenticity as un-self-aware cultural (and racial) purity.  For a 
critical review of the uses of authenticity in popular music, see Hugh Barker and Yuval 
Taylor, Faking It: The Quest for Authenticity in Popular Music (2007). 
77 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rO_r1drXn0I  
78 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q_eE0NPArEY  
79 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hIWlWA1YTBw  
80 Dave Marsh, Elvis 28 (1982), quoted in Theodore Gracyk, Rhythm and Noise: An 
Aesthetics of Rock 14 
81 While “echo” may and typically does have several progressively smaller delayed 
peaks or regenerations, “slap-back” or “slap echo” consists of a single repetition.  See  
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playback of that recording a fraction of a second later as the tape passed a 
second head.82 That setup applied uniform echo to the whole recording.  Jack 
Clement, an engineer who started working at Sun Studios in 1956, further 
refined the technique, by incorporating a sub-mixer that allowed him to apply 
slap-back selectively, causing some instruments and voices to echo more than 
others, and thus creating different senses of space on a single recording.83 
As Greg Milner has noted, “[s]lap-back was the very antithesis of high 
fidelity – not just because it distorted the signal, but also because it had 
nothing to do with capturing a performance.”84  Those involved with creating 
the recording were now focusing on the sound experience of the recording as 
the product, independent of anything that could be heard live in the recording 
studio.  Jack Clement put it succinctly: “I wasn’t trying to deal with reality.  I 
was trying to improve on it.”85 
The overall result, argues Theodore Gracyk, is that the recording erases 
“any distinction between the performance and the musical work”: 
This music unifies an interpretation with a specific sound medium as 
inseparable parts of a single work; each listener who learns these songs 
                                                                                                                                            
Wikipedia, Delay, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delay .  The rarity of a single 
perfectly-defined repetition in nature may make slap-back feel artificial, other-
worldly, and novel. 
82 For some details on the tape recorder setup at Sun Studios, see the footnote on “Sun 
Tape Echo” towards the bottom of the page entitled “Elvis at Sun: An Overview of the 
Audio Restoration,” http://www.elvisrecordings.com/r_elvisatsun.htm.  At Chess 
Records in Chicago, Leonard Chess engaged in similar experimentation through 
acoustic means, “placing open microphones in toilets and sections of sewer pipe 
suspended from the ceiling,” and eventually building a separate echo chamber in the 
basement of the studio.   D. Thomas Moon, “Strange Voodoo: Inside the Vaults of 
Chess Studios,” Blues Access No. 36 (Winter 1999), 
http://www.bluesaccess.com/No_36/chess.html  
83 Greg Milner, Perfecting Sound Forever: An Aural History of Recorded Music 152 
(2009).  Guitarist Scotty Moore also began to use a guitar amplifier that had its own 
built-in tape delay, allowing the guitar to echo differently than everything else.  See 
Peter Doyle, Echo and Reverb: Fabricating Space in Popular Music, 1900-1960 188 
(2005). 
84 Greg Milner, Perfecting Sound Forever 151. 
85 Id. at 152.  Les Paul was another great innovator, who did important work before the 
Presley Sun Studios sessions.  He was one of the pioneers of multitrack recording, of 
intentionally varying recorded speed, and of using echo and reverb.  His 1951 hit 
recording of “How High the Moon” with his wife Mary Ford, which was created by 
overdubbing both his guitar and Mary’s voice 12 times, must be considered another 
milestone in the transformation from captured performance to audio work.  See 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ng8a5Df2V50.   
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through these recordings grasps every aspect as properties of a total 
musical work.  The timbre of Presley’s voice, the phrasing, even the sound 
of his voice on that particular day, is as much a part of the musical work as 
the melody or the syncopation.86 
Of course, it is worth recalling that the Presley Sun Studio recordings 
represent an incremental step.  Presley was working with songs that others 
had written,87 and each recording was generated without overdubbing or 
splicing, from one continuous real-time performance, even if Presley had 
recorded many other performances and listened to those recordings before 
creating the recording that was publicly released. 
 The story of the next several decades of the sound recording in 
popular music can be told in several ways.  One could describe all of the new 
technologies that have been introduced since the 1950s.  These include 
multitrack recording, various kinds of sound processing, synthesizers and 
electronic sound synthesis, and sequencers.88  Beginning in the 1980s, the 
introduction of computers led to the recreation of all of these tools in digital 
form, and the addition of new digitally implemented techniques, such as real-
time pitch alteration of singing, popularized under the brand name Auto-
Tune,89 and digital sampling.90   
One could also describe some of the most famous ways those 
technologies were used to create distinct sound styles, from the use of echo 
chambers to create Phil Spector’s “Wall of Sound,”91 to the use of compressors 
                                                          
86 Theodore Gracyk, Rhythm and Noise: An Aesthetics of Rock 14 (1996) (emphasis in 
original). 
87 It is worth noting that many songs recorded by Elvis Presley were written and 
previously recorded by African-Americans who due to racism could not enter the 
White popular music market, and who often had signed contracts that gave them 
little or no royalties, or were otherwise cheated out of royalties.  For the story of 
Arthur Crudup, composer of “That’s Alright Mama,” and the fight to obtain royalties 
that succeeded only after his death, see Dick Waterman, Between Midnight and Day: 
The Last Unpublished Blues Archive (2003). 
88 For a recent systematic review of all of these technologies, see Jay Hodgson, 
Understanding Records: A Field Guide to Recording Practice (2010). 
89 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Auto-Tune. 
90 For a history and prehistory of digital sampling, see Kembrew McLeod and Peter 
DiCola, Creative License: The Law and Culture of Digital Sampling 19-74 (2011). 
91 The “Wall of Sound” style used large ensembles and overdubbing, combined with an 
echo chamber, to produce a rich, blended sound that was successful in part because it 
sounded good on transistor radios, which were becoming popular at the time.  See 
Wikipedia, “Wall of Sound,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wall_of_Sound.  Classic 
Wall of Sound recordings include The Ronettes, “Be My Baby,” 
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and noise gates to create the 1980s gated drum sound,92 and the use of Auto-
Tune by artists like Cher93 and T-Pain,94 not to mask off-key singing, but to 
create a distinctive synthesized vocal style.   
The point here, however, is that these all reveal that the typical 
product for sale as popular music is not a transparent, veridic “recording” of 
any performance, but a carefully constructed audio fiction, that like all fiction 
takes its place in what has by now become a rich literature. 
C. The Move Away from Musical Notation  
 Although there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that musical notation 
has become less important to the creation of musical works, that shift is 
demonstrated more systematically by an analysis of more than 4.5 million 
musical-work copyright registrations at the United States Copyright Office 
from 1978 through 2012.  When an author applies to register a claim of 
copyright in a work, he or she must deposit copies of that work.  Information 
about the type of deposit made – in the case of musical work registrations, 
principally either musical notation or a sound recording (technically, a 
phonorecord) – is preserved in the registration record.  Figure 1 summarizes 
the results of a study of the types of deposits submitted with over 4.5 million 
musical work registration applications from 1978 through 2012.   
The bar chart presents an estimate of the percentages of musical work 
registrations made each year on the basis of, respectively, notation deposits 
and phonorecord deposits.  In 1978, 86% of musical works registered were 
accompanied by deposits of notation, and only 14% by phonorecord deposits.  
By 2012, 77% of musical work registrations were accompanied by phonorecord 
deposits, and only 17% by deposits of musical notation (6% were accompanied 
only by deposits of text – lyrics – and hence technically did not qualify as 
musical works).   
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QzhbGaCwBzs and Ike and Tina Turner, “River 
Deep Mountain High,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tipw66XjXn4.    
92 See Greg Milner, Perfecting Sound Forever 152 (2009).  A classic gated drum 
recording is Phil Collins, “In the Air Tonight” (1981), see Wikipedia, “In the Air 
Tonight”, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In_the_Air_Tonight; 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YkADj0TPrJA.   
93 See Cher, “Believe” (1998), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LbXiECmCZ94.  
94 See, e.g., T-Pain, “Can’t Believe It” (featuring Lil Wayne) (2008), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kWBE0sQC5L8; Plies, “Shawty” (featuring T-
Pain) (2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vJ7k0XZqdaU. 
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The solid line in the chart shows the percentage of published musical 
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work registrations accompanied by deposits of musical notation. Throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s, that percentage remains substantially higher than the 
percentage of all musical work registrations accompanied by notation 
deposits. To the extent that the distinction between published and 
unpublished musical works serves as a rough proxy for professional and 
amateur authors, it appears that professional composers and publishers stuck 
with notation longer.  By 2012, however, only about 27% of published musical 
work registrations are accompanied by notation; nearly three-quarters are 
accompanied only by sound recordings.   
The dotted line shows the percentage of unpublished musical work 
registrations accompanied by notation deposits.  For the most part, it more 
closely follows the percentage for all musical work registrations shown in the 
bar chart, for the simple reason that there are many more unpublished than 
published musical works registered, and hence that unpublished registrations 
more heavily influence the overall numbers.  Two periods – the three-year 
period of 1990-1992, and the three-year period of 2005-2006 – are shaded.  For 
most years, a large percentage of musical work registrations contain 
information about accompanying deposits – on average, excluding those six 
years, about 90%.  During those six years, however, far fewer musical work 
registrations contain deposit information – on average, fewer than 30% – and 
for unknown reasons those that do may not be representative, leading to some 
likely anomalies in the figures presented.  
Lastly, the double line reveals something interesting, not about the 
types of deposits made, but about the types of registration applications filed.  
Since 1978, claimants can choose to file either an application to register a 
musical work by itself, or a combined application to register both a musical 
work and a sound recording.  The latter requires the applicant to submit a 
single phonorecord deposit for both claimed works.  The double line shows 
the percentage of all musical work registrations that were filed each year as 
combined musical work / sound recording applications.  In 1978, only two 
percent of musical work registrations were filed as combined musical work / 
sound recording applications; 98% were filed for musical works alone.  In the 
30 years from 1978 to 2008, the percentage of combined applications slowly 
but steadily increases, from 2% to 23%.  Then, from 2008 through 2012, the 
percentage increases more sharply.  By 2012, 49% of all registrations of 
musical works are being filed as combined registrations of musical works and 
sound recordings, with a single phonorecord deposit.  One interpretation, at 
least, is that the more and more claimants are simply trying to register 
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whatever is copyrightable in the phonorecords that they deposit, and are not 
focused on the distinction between musical work and sound recording.95 
III. THE DIFFICULTY OF SPLITTING COMPOSITION FROM PERFORMANCE UNDER 
A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE 1976 ACT  
Recall that the Copyright Act of 1976 worked a potentially enormous 
change in music copyright law when it recognized protection for 
phonorecord-embodied musical works, rejecting the view, which had been in 
place for the entire history of U.S. copyright law, that musical works were 
works fixed in written notation. Moreover, Congress apparently meant to 
have this change in perspective apply retroactively.96   
The removal of the written notation requirement could be read as 
recognizing that there are phonorecord-embedded musical works that are 
works of authorship of a different kind than notated musical works, and that 
such works deserve to be treated on their own terms, as extending to all of the 
repeatable musical experience fixed in the phonorecord, just as a notated 
musical work includes every element of notation.  However, the 1976 Act also 
                                                          
95 For a more detailed explanation of this copyright registration study, and of the 
methodology underlying it, see the online note at 
http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/rbrauneis/musicalworkcopyright/musicalworkregist
rations.htm. 
96 I come to this last conclusion primarily from a reading of the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in ABKCO Music, Inc. v. LaVere, 217 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2000), as well as from the 
Copyright Office’s statement in its Compendium II of Copyright Office Practices. 
.ABKCO Music involved two of the songs that Robert Johnson had recorded back in 
1936 – “Love in Vain” and “Stop Breakin' Down.”  Before 1978, they had never been 
registered, and it seems pretty clear that they had never been fixed in notated form by 
Johnson or by anyone authorized by him or his successors.  In 1974, Stephen LaVere 
located Carrie Thompson, Johnson’s sister, who was thought to be Johnson’s only 
living heir, and entered into an agreement with her to try to generate income from 
Johnson’s compositions in return for a 50% share of royalties generated.96  In 1991, 
LaVere registered the two Johnson compositions at issue, along with 22 others.  See, 
e.g., “Love in Vain,” U.S. Copyright Registration No. PA0000546956 (April 9, 1991).  As 
a deposit, he submitted, not scores for any of the compositions, but a phonorecord – a 
1990 Columbia rerelease of the Robert Johnson recordings on two CDs.  While the 
Ninth Circuit’s direct holding is that the 1936 and 1937 recordings did not publish the 
songs, the ABKCO Music litigation seems to assume that those recordings did fix those 
songs, and that the 1976 Act’s rule that fixation of musical works in phonorecords is 
sufficient to obtain federal copyright protection is retroactive, encompassing all 
musical works that were fixed only in phonorecords before 1978.  Section 405.03 of 
the Compendium of Copyright Office Practices (Compendium II), published in 1984, 
states simply: “music embodied only in phonorecords before 1978 is now acceptable 
for registration in that form.”  
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preserves two limitations on copyright in sound recordings that were 
introduced in the Sound Recording Act of 1971.  Under § 114(b), the 
reproduction and derivative work rights in sound recordings are limited to 
copying by electronic or mechanical processes;97 § 106(4) excludes sound 
recordings from the general right of public performance98 and §§ 106(6) and 
114(d) through 114(h) grant them only a limited digital audio transmission 
right.99  One possible interpretation of these limitations, read together with 
the grant of copyright protection to phonorecord-embodied musical works, is 
that the musical works embodied in phonorecords are not co-extensive with 
the sound recordings embodied in those same phonorecords, but rather 
consist only of some features of that sound.  Those features, as we will see, are 
typically identified as compositional features, whereas the other features, 
which form part of the sound recording but not the musical work, are 
identified as performance features.  I will dub this interpretation of the 1976 
Act the “conservative” interpretation because under it, the 1976 Act preserves 
much of the approach to musical works and sound recordings established in 
the Sound Recording Act of 1971: the composition/performance distinction 
stands, and performances are granted less protection than compositions.  
If there were one clear way of isolating a subset of features within a 
musical sound recording that constituted the musical composition, and 
separating them from performance features,  then it might be tempting to 
adopt the conservative interpretation of the 1976 Act as best fitting the 
language of the Act’s provisions, whether or not it expresses the best policy 
approach.  However, this Part will argue that, in trying to isolate musical 
works within sound recordings, courts and commentators have adopted, not 
one approach, but a varying and unstable combination of four approaches, and 
that all of these approaches are difficult to apply to sound recordings.  The 
failure to articulate a workable approach for isolating musical work from 
sound recording raises an administrability problem that stands in the way of 
adopting a conservative interpretation, and requires another look at a more 
radical interpretation, which will be the subject of Part IV.  
A. Support for Preservation of a Composition/Performance Distinction in 
Legislative History, Judicial Decisions, and Commentary 
The preservation of a composition/performance distinction to isolate 
musical works within sound recordings finds some support, not only in the 
                                                          
97 See 17 U.S.C. §114(b). 
98 See 17 U.S.C. §106(4). 
99 See 17 U.S.C. §106(6); 17 U.S.C. §§114(d) – 114(h); 
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language of § 114(b), but also in legislative history, in judicial decisions, and 
among commentators.  Thus, for example, the House Report to the 1976 Act 
states that “[m]ere imitation of a recorded performance would not constitute 
a copyright infringement even where one performer deliberately sets out to 
simulate another’s performance as exactly as possible.”100  Although this 
statement does not explicitly refer to musical performances, there is other 
legislative history suggesting that musical performances are exactly what 
some participants in the legislative process had in mind.101  Thus, the idea – 
vague though it might be, and conceived of at a time when notated musical 
works, as the only protected musical works, could serve as an anchor for 
defining the musical work generally  – is that within every musical sound 
recording, there will be some aspects of sound that will be merely products of 
“performance,” and that will therefore be protected only against mechanical or 
electronic copying and not against independently fixed imitation, whereas 
other aspects of sound will form the “musical composition” or “musical work,” 
which will be fully protected against imitation.   
In the face of this complicated scheme and history, most courts appear 
to have adopted some variation of a conservative interpretation, under which 
musical works consist of the compositional elements within a sound 
recording that contains both compositional and performance elements. Thus, 
for example, in Swirsky v. Carey,102 the Ninth Circuit approved of the plaintiff’s 
expert’s omission of some notes a vocalist sung and other notes a bass player 
played in comparing plaintiff’s and defendant’s recordings, because those were 
characterized as “performance-related” and “ornamental” rather than 
“compositional elements” and “structural.”103   In Newton v. Diamond,104 the 
                                                          
100 Copyright Law Revision, H. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 106; see id. (“statutory protection 
for sound recordings extends only to the particular sounds of which the recording 
consists, and would not prevent a separate recording of another performance in which 
those sounds are imitated”). 
101 See Copyright Law Revision Part 3, Preliminary Draft for Revised U.S. Copyright 
Law and Discussions and Comments on the Draft,  p. 196  (comments of Sydney A. 
Diamond, London Records)  (meeting of April 11, 1963) (referring to a case involving a 
musical sound recording and then stating “If somebody goes into a studio and fixes an 
independent performance, that cannot possibly constitute an infringement in an 
existing sound recording”);  see also id. at 352, 356 (letter of Sydney A. Diamond, 
February 11, 1963) (suggesting that sound recordings would only be protected against 
“dubbing”).. 
102 376 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2004). 
103 Id. at 847. At the same time, Swirsky contemplates that not only melody, harmony, 
and rhythm, but also tempo, phrasing, key, genre, lyrics, and structure should be 
taken in to account in determining substantial similarity of musical works, which 
represents a comparatively broad view of such works.  See id. at 848-849.   
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Ninth Circuit held that the complex, shifting timbre of a note sequence in a 
piece of recorded music entitled “Choir” was not part of the musical work 
presented in that recording, because although James Newton both composed 
and recorded the music, only the note sequence counted as composition, while 
the timbre was attributable to performance technique.  Similarly, in Poindexter 
v. EMI Record Group,105 the Southern District of New York concluded that the 
musical work in a recording of a piano was confined to the note played on the 
piano – an F sharp, as it turns out – and did not include the tone quality of the 
piano as it varied over time. Only the Sixth Circuit, in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 
UMG Recordings, Inc.,106 has used language that is conceivably compatible with 
the view that sound recording and musical work can be coextensive. In that 
case, involving the George Clinton song “Atomic Dog,” it rejected objections 
to the District Court’s decision to allow the jury to consider several elements 
that featured in both plaintiff’s and defendant’s independently fixed sound 
recordings, including “’repetition of the word 'dog' in a low tone of voice at 
regular intervals’" and "’the sound of rhythmic panting.” Because “Atomic Dog” 
was created in a recording studio without a written score, the court stated, 
“the composition of "Atomic Dog" is embedded in the sound recording.”107 
Some commentators have also advocated a conservative 
interpretation.  David Nimmer, criticizing the Bridgeport Music case, opines that 
some elements of a sound recording would fall outside of the musical work 
embodied in that recording: “If George Clinton's distinctive voice or the 
timbre of guitars and drums were copied by defendant, any redress would lie 
solely for the sound recording copyright, not for that of the musical 
composition.”108  He therefore argues that the Sixth Circuit was wrong in 
allowing the jury to consider the two elements above.   Professor  Jamie Lund 
has conducted an important set of experiments which demonstrated that 
listeners are often influenced in their perceptions of similarity between two 
musical sound recordings by such matters as tempo, key signature, 
                                                                                                                                            
104 349 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2003). 
105 2012 WL 1027639 (S.D.N.Y.). 
106 585 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2009). 
107 Id. at 272.  It might be reading too much into the court’s statement to conclude that 
“embedded” means “possibly coextensive,” for in a footnote appended to that 
statement, the court quotes the standard definition of a musical work as consisting of 
rhythm, harmony, and melody.  Nonetheless, the court’s willingness to include “the 
repetition of the word ‘dog’ in a low tone of voice at regular intervals” and “the sound 
of rhythmic panting” suggests a broad view of what sounds count as part of the 
musical work. 
108 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 2.05 [A]. 
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orchestration, and style.109  Her normative conclusion, however,  is that courts 
should be wary of playing sound recordings to juries, because those aspects of 
music lie outside of the “dominant” musical work definition limited to 
“rhythm, harmony and melody.”110 Since sound recordings contain both 
“performance” elements and “composition” elements, they could lead juries to 
find musical works to be more or less similar than they actually are.  
B. Separating Composition from Performance within Sound Recordings: Not 
One Approach but Four, Applied Inconsistently and with Difficulty 
It cannot be my aim here to conclusively demonstrate that isolation of 
musical works within sound recordings along any composition/performance 
lines is infeasible and suboptimal.  I do, however, want to convey some strong 
doubts.  I will argue that there is not one single approach to or test for 
separating composition from performance implicit in the analyses of courts, 
advocates, and commentators, but four such approaches. Even in pre-sound-
recording days, those approaches often diverged from one another, and they 
certainly diverge when applied to sound recordings.  I will also argue that the 
tests used to separate composition from performance are very difficult to 
apply to sound recordings in any way that would reflect some different cost 
structure with regard to creation or enforcement, and hence that would 
therefore provide some reason to distinguish them from the point of view of 
copyright policy. 
I will call the four approaches the notation approach; the etiology 
approach; the macro/micro approach; and the musical analysis approach.  The 
notation approach asks: did that feature of musical sound stem from musical 
notation, or can it be represented in notation?  The etiology approach asks: 
was that feature created through a deliberative, non-real-time process, or a 
spontaneous, real-time one?  The macro/micro approach asks: does that 
feature appear only on a scale of more than one note or chord, or does it appear 
within a single note or chord? The musical analysis approach asks: is that 
feature a basic part of the harmonic, melodic, or rhythmic structure of the 
piece, or is it incidental thereto? 
Consider, first, a hypothetical situation in which all four approaches 
might line up with each other to create the sense that composition and  
performance are really two separate activities that result in two separate 
products.  Suppose that one person created a notated composition with lyrics, 
                                                          
109 See Jamie Lund, An Empirical Examination of the Lay Listener Test in Music 
Composition Copyright Infringement, 11 Va. Sports & Ent. L. J. 117 (2011). 
110 See id. at 146-147 (2011). 
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a song in the old-fashioned sheet music sense of the word, entitled “Someone 
Like You.”  That song contained the line “Never mind, I’ll find someone like 
you,” and a notated melody to which the line was supposed to be sung.  The 
notated melody for the word “you” consisted of a single note.  Along comes a 
singer.  The very first time she sings the song, she adds an appoggiatura in the 
middle of singing the word “you.”  That is to say, her voice very briefly moves 
down a half step, and then moves back up again to conclude the word on the 
written note.  
Adele Laurie Blue Adkins, known professionally as Adele, does in fact 
perform such an appoggiatura in the sound recording of “Someone Like You” 
that won her a 2012 Grammy Award for Best Pop Solo Performance.111  One 
scientist has claimed that that appoggiatura plays a large role in the emotional 
appeal of that performance.112  Some of the other facts in the paragraph above, 
however, have come from my imagination.  Applying the four tests or 
approaches, we would say that (1) the appoggiatura was not part of the 
notated work; (2) Adele came up with it spontaneously; (3) it was a micro-
level feature, within a single sung syllable, lasting for a fraction of a second; 
and (4) it was not marking a shift towards a basic harmonic tension or 
resolution in the piece.  Maybe, we would say, features like that one deserve 
less protection than features for which all four tests came out the other way.  
Of course, any single feature in isolation does not deserve copyright protection 
(a topic that will receive further attention below), but right now we’re just 
engaged in a filtering process, removing certain elements before conducting a 
substantial similarity analysis that would take a group of remaining elements 
into account as a whole.   
1.  The Notation Approach.   
Now let us consider each approach separately, and examine how each 
might apply to a sound recording, and might or might not line up with the 
others.  The notation approach obviously has strong ties to the traditional, 
pre-1976 Act view that copyright-protected musical works are works of 
notation.  Results of an approach that examined actual notation would likely 
have some correlation to results of an etiology approach, at least in the era 
before computer-generated notation, since manually-generated notation likely 
                                                          
111 See Wikipedia, Grammy award for Best Solo Pop Performance, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grammy_Award_for_Best_Pop_Solo_Performance. 
112 Michaeleen Doucleff, “Anatomy of a Tear-Jerker: Why does Adele’s ‘Someone Like 
You’ make everyone cry?  Science has found the formula,” The Wall Street Journal, 
February 11, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203646004577213010291701378.html   
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involves deliberation.  Consider Newton v. Diamond,113 which touches on the 
issue of whether the timbre of a recorded James Newton flute performance is 
part of the musical work fixed in that recording.  In that case, Newton had 
notated the work,114  and both the majority and the dissent claim to be taking 
the notation into account.  The dissent, however, gives more weight to the fact 
that the notation contains a written instruction that the “piece requires 
singing into the flute and fingering simultaneously,” and indicates the 
different notes to be sung and fingered, and also contains notations that the 
piece should be played “largo” and “senza misura.”115  The majority places little 
emphasis on those parts of the notation, and indicates agreement with expert 
testimony presented by the defendants that the musical work is “’merely a 
common, trite, and generic three-note sequence.’”116  Thus, the dissent may be 
more purely following the notation approach, acknowledging that written 
notation often includes special directions that shape timbre, and not just 
pitches and duration.117  The majority, on the other hand, is actually headed in 
                                                          
113 349 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2003).  For a critique of the Newton decision written by 
Newton’s attorney, see Alan Korn, Issues Facing Legal Practitioners in Measuring 
Substantiality of Contemporary Musical Expression, 6 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 
489 (2007). 
114 There are two registration records for “Axum,” the collection of James Newton 
music that includes “Choir,” the piece at issue in Newton v. Diamond.  One is clearly for 
the sound recording as released by ECM Records. It bears the registration number 
SR0000034394; lists the copyright claimant as ECM; and lists the type of work as 
“Sound Recording.”  The other one bears the registration number of SRu000034748; 
lists the copyright claimant as James Newton; lists the type of work as “Music”; and 
describes the deposit as “1 sound cassette.” Although the “SR” registration number 
suggests that Newton applied to register his claim on the form appropriate for a 
sound recording, it turns out that a lot of claimants in musical works do that, and in 
those cases the Copyright Office simply issues a musical work registration under the 
“SR” number.  A database of copyright registrations constructed by the author of this 
article reveals that there are over 300,000 registrations for musical works bearing “SR” 
numbers.  James Newton may well have mistakenly used the SR form because he was 
depositing a phonorecord, rather than a score, in connection with his registration, as 
is perfectly allowable for a musical work registration after 1977.  The phonorecord 
deposit, however, raises the issue of why the score that figures in the Newton v. Diamond 
litigation has any relevance at all.  By using a phonorecord as a deposit, Newton was 
registering the musical work as it was fixed in that phonorecord, not as fixed in a 
score that he prepared at some time before or after he created the phonorecord, and 
the notated work need not be the same as the musical work fixed in the phonorecord. 
115 See id. at 598-600 (Graber, J., dissenting). 
116 Id. at 597 (majority opinion) (quoting testimony of Dr. Lawrence Ferrara). 
117 For further details on aspects of musical notation that concern timbre, see the 
online note at 
http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/rbrauneis/musicalworkcopyright/notationandtimbre
.htm. 
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the direction of the macro/micro approach, taking the position that timbre is 
“performance” and only larger melodic and harmonic structures are 
“composition.”118  
When musical works fixed in phonorecords are at issue, the notation 
approach must be applied in a dramatically altered form.  One has to ask what 
could be notated from the recording in an after-the-fact transcription, rather 
than what (if anything) actually was notated before, or after, the recording.  If 
a score were fixed before a related phonorecord, the musical work fixed in the 
phonorecord could arguably be a more developed or altered derivative of the 
work fixed in the score. If the score were fixed afterwards, it is only one 
transcriber’s interpretation of what she heard, and in many instances could 
itself be a derivative work intentionally altered to serve the particular 
demands of anticipated purchasers of sheet music.119   
In the typical case, an after-the-fact transcription would result in a 
much thicker “musical work” than is typically represented in sheet music, let 
alone lead sheets. Such a transcription would capture the “arrangement” for 
all of the instruments and voices that were represented in the recording, and 
matters such as tempo, dynamics, and special performance techniques.  It 
would also include features such as vocal melismas,120 solos, drum accents, 
guitar fillers, and so on, that might have been improvised on the spot or even 
added by mistake, thus sending the notation approach off in a different 
direction than the etiology approach.   
Thus, for example, in Straughter  v. Raymond,121 which involves plaintiff 
Straughter’s claim that defendant Usher Raymond’s song “Burn” infringed his 
song “The Reasons Why,” the  court assumes that plaintiff’s expert has 
correctly included melismas sung in both songs in his after-the-fact 
                                                          
118 The lower court follows a notation approach, but finds that the timbre in the 
recording is influenced too much by unnotated performance techniques, including 
overblowing of the flute.  See Newton v. Diamond, 204 F.Supp. 1244, 1251-1252 (C.D. Cal. 
2002). 
119 Sean O’Connor recounts his own discovery that sheet music versions were 
intentionally modified – “simplified” – by publishing company transcribers, and flags 
the issue of what version counts as the copyrighted work, in Sean O’Connor, What 
Composers and Copyright Lawyers Can Teach Each Other Part II, at 15:40 – 16:45, 
http://vimeo.com/31586134. 
120 “Melisma, in music, is the singing of a single syllable of text while moving between 
several different notes in succession.”  Wikipedia, “Melisma,” 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Melisma 
121 2011 WL 3651350 (C.D. Cal.) 
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transcriptions.122  There is no indication of what criterion of inclusion the 
expert was using (other than whatever might be beneficial to his client), but 
inclusion was certainly consistent with an after-the-fact transcription 
approach, as they are just other notes sung by the singer.   By contrast, in 
Swirsky v. Carey,123 the court holds that the plaintiff’s expert did not err in 
omitting sung melismas and appoggiaturas from the transcription he used to 
analyze substantial similarity.  That is inconsistent with a notation approach, 
and while appoggiaturas are arguably “micro-level,” melismas could be seen as 
more “macro-level” – they can run on for several measures, as some 
performances by Mariah Carey, the defendant in Swirsky v. Carey, will 
demonstrate.124  In Swirsky, however, Swirsky’s expert justifies the omission on 
a combination of the etiology approach and the musical analysis approach.  He 
seems to assume that the melismas and appoggiaturas were added 
spontaneously, which might or might not have been true, and he also suggests 
that they weren’t structural – that they didn’t mark harmonic changes.125  
Without distinguishing between those two approaches, the court decides 
that the melismas and appoggiaturas were validly omitted as “performance 
related.”126 
Is the notation approach a valid method to distinguish between 
composition and performance elements of sound recordings?  Any use of such 
a method seems to fly in the face of Congress’s fundamental decision in the 
1976 Act to discard the notation requirement.  As the Senate Report put it, the 
choice of broad language in § 102 of the Act, providing that fixation in any 
tangible medium would be sufficient, “is intended to avoid the artificial and 
largely unjustifiable distinctions, derived from cases such as White-Smith 
                                                          
122 See Straughter, 2011 WL 3651350 at *14 (“According to [plaintiff’s expert,] ‘Reasons’ 
and ‘Burn’ share substantially similar . . . uses and placements of melisma”); id. at *15 
(Plaintiff’s expert “further asserts that the stylistic use of a melisma prior to the fade 
out in both songs contributes to their substantial similarity”).  Both “The Reasons 
Why” and “Burn” were created collaboratively in recording studios, and never existed 
in notated form.  In both cases, the deposits that accompanied the musical work 
copyright registrations were sound recordings.  See U.S. Copyright Registration 
PAu002313592 (“The Reasons Why”); U.S. Copyright Registration PA0001159079 
(“Burn”).   
123 376 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2004). 
124 See, e.g., [HD] Mariah Carey - Best Studio Vocal Runs, Riffs & Melismatic Phrases, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X1zJ8xiCFzU.  
125 See Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 847 (quoting Swirsky’s expert as stating that he “took 
[melismas and appoggiaturas] to be a matter of the singer customizing the song and 
regarded those notes as not structural; they are ornamental”). 
126 Id. 
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Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908), under which statutory 
copyrightability in certain cases has been made to depend upon the form or 
medium in which the work is fixed.”127    At the very least, one would think, 
that approach should not be limited to notation that is intended as direction 
for human performance, a relic of a musical practice that is no longer exclusive 
or even dominant.  Yet once that limitation is discarded, it is hard to know 
where to stop.  Presumably notation for machine-synthesized and –sequenced 
music could be included, and such notation would be exact as to all elements 
of sound in a recording, including harmonics and attack-sustain-decay-release 
envelopes.128 Once such notation is included, there is no limit: a digital music 
file itself is a form of notation of the music to be rendered by an electronic 
device. 
2.  The Etiology Approach.   
The etiology approach asks whether the feature in question resulted 
from the deliberate activity of composition or the spontaneous activity of 
performance.129 This approach may have some intuitive appeal if we value the 
creative labor of deliberation over spur-of-the-moment spontaneity, and if we 
conclude that such creative labor has more need for  the incentive of copyright 
protection.  There is some difficulty in applying this approach to any musical 
practice, because there seems to be a continuum of more or less deliberative 
acts in creating music, rather than two discontinuous categories of 
composition and performance.  For example, many performers rehearse before 
performance, and a rehearsal can involve deliberation about creating music.  
Extensive orchestral rehearsals can involve repeated experiments, followed by 
choices among alternatives, and orchestra members will even frequently 
annotate their scores to represent the choices that that have been made,130 
                                                          
127 Copyright Law Revision, S. Rep. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 51 (1976). 
128 Consider, for example, two videos which lead the viewer step-by-step through the 
creation of a “synth line,” or synthesized music loop, of a popular electro house 
recording.  See “How to make synth line from Bodyrox Yeah Yeah D. Ramirez Remix - 
Sounds To Sample,”     http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kgt_trNHWJY;  “Create the 
"Yeah Yeah" Bodyrox synth in Reason 4.0! (Tutorial),”  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YT3u6HNWsi0.  Those videos lead the viewer 
through adjusting a series of settings on a synthesizer, including some settings of 
oscillators that produce the distinctive timbres of the synth line.  A listing of those 
settings would seem to constitute notation of every element of sound produced. 
129 Sean O’Connor explores this distinction in Sean O’Connor, What Composers and 
Copyright Lawyers Can Teach Each Other Part III, at 9:05 – 12:00, 
http://vimeo.com/31602019 . 
130 For a study of 25,000 annotations made by performing musicians on scores, see 
Megan A. Winget, Annotations on musical scores by performing musicians: 
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thus creating what might qualify as compositional elements under the 
notation approach.  In the age of audio recording, a performer like Elvis 
Presley can iteratively experiment through performing and listening to 
playback,131 thus expanding the role of deliberation in performance. 
The etiology approach is particularly difficult to apply to 
contemporary non-veridic sound recordings, because they typically are 
constructed in dense layers of composition and performance, if we take 
composition to include the deliberate activities of selecting recorded passages, 
mixing them, altering them through processing, and so on.132  It will often be 
very difficult even to reconstruct, in an era of sophisticated digital music 
production software and hardware, whether any particular feature stemmed 
from performance or deliberative processing.  It may be that when Robert 
Johnson sings the first syllable of the word “hearted” in his recording of 
“Drunken Hearted Man” 133 10 cents lower than a true G sharp, he is doing so 
spontaneously in performance – although it is possible that even there, our 
desire to hear Johnson as an authentic, unselfconscious figure may deafen us 
to the possibility that he engaged in more deliberation than meets the ear.134   
Moving forward about 70 years, the background vocals in Rihanna’s recording 
of  “S.O.S.”135 are also microtonally off pitch – the right channel vocals are 
raised by 9 cents, and the left channel lowered by 9 cents – and they are also 
between 13 and 19 milliseconds behind the beat.  That, however, is the work of 
Phil Tan, the mix engineer for “S.O.S.,” who electronically adjusted the vocals 
after recording, and presumably after having experimented with several 
                                                                                                                                            
Collaborative models, interactive methods, and music digital library tool 
development, 59 J. Am. Soc. for Info. Sci. & Tech. 1878 (2008). 
131 See supra TAN xxx. 
132 For further description of this layering, see TAN xx, supra. 
133 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hbwLznhwIQ8. 
134 There is a tantalizing hint that Johnson or the record company that released his 
records may have been interested, not just in faithfully capturing his performance, but 
in creating a recorded sound experience that does not exist in the real world.  Some 
have argued that the recordings were sped up by 20% or more before release, perhaps 
intentionally to make the playing and singing faster than it was in real life.  See Jon 
Wilde, Robert Johnson revelation tells us to put brakes on the blues, The Guardian, 
Music Blog, May 27, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/musicblog/2010/may/27/robert-johnson-blues 
(“Either the recordings were accidentally speeded up when first committed to 78, or 
else they were deliberately speeded up to make them sound more exciting. Whatever, 
the common consensus among musicologists is that we've been listening to Johnson 
at least 20% too fast.”). 
135  See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IXmF4GbA86E.  
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options before settling on just those levels of pitch alteration and delay. 136 The 
“S.O.S.” example also shows how the etiology approach could diverge from the 
micro/macro approach, since 9 cents and 13 milliseconds are presumably 
“micro” features, and from the music analysis approach, since there are no 
major harmonic or rhythmic changes implicated. 
3.  The Macro/Micro Approach.   
The micro/macro approach takes the position that all nuances that 
occur within individual notes, such as overtones and changes over note 
envelopes, are not part of musical works, which consist only of larger-scale 
structures of melody, harmony, and rhythm.   This approach seems to be an 
important driver in the decisions of the courts in Newton v. Diamond137 and 
Poindexter v. EMI Record Group,138 which filter out timbral detail before 
concluding that the “notes,” stripped of detail, are not sufficiently complex to 
be protected by copyright law.  Those examples suggest that courts often see 
the micro/macro approach as aligned with the notation approach, on the 
assumption that traditional Western staff notation contains nothing other 
than notes, and therefore has nothing to say about smaller-scale details.  
Although it is true that Western staff notation may emphasize larger scale 
structures, I have tried to show above that Western staff notation can include 
plenty of directions that are intended to influence smaller-scale details, and 
that the alignment between those two approaches is therefore far from 
perfect.    
The intuitive appeal of the macro/micro approach may be attributed 
in part to the perception that small-scale details are produced spontaneously 
in performance, and do not need copyright protection because they cannot be 
perfectly copied by others: no other vocalist can become Luciano Pavarotti or 
Adele Adkins.  As sound technologies improve, however, small-scale details in 
recordings become easier to manipulate independent of performance, as the 
“S.O.S.” example above demonstrates.  Another part of the intuitive appeal of 
this approach may be connected to the opinion that copyright should be 
concerned with protecting works – larger-scale, coherent assemblages – rather 
than small-scale details.  That view, however, does not necessarily justify 
excluding small-scale details from consideration as components of those 
assemblages, any more than we would say that, because individual notes are 
                                                          
136 See “Secrets of the Mix Engineers: Phil Tan,”  
http://www.soundonsound.com/sos/feb07/articles/insidetrack_0207.htm.  
137 349 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2003). 
138 2012 WL 1027639 (S.D.N.Y.). 
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not protected, we should remove every note from a notated composition 
before conducting infringement analysis.     
4. The Music Analysis Approach.   
Music analysis, and tonal analysis in particular, presumes that all 
notes in a musical composition can be hierarchically ordered in relation to a 
melodic and harmonic structure that is grounded on a tonal center – one note 
that is the center and point of repose for the entire composition.  Most 
popular music can be classified as tonal, and thus is susceptible of tonal 
analysis.  Rhythm can also feature in musical analysis, with accented beats 
counted as higher up in the hierarchy then unaccented beats.  One can see 
applications of such analytical methods – whether they are good applications 
or not – in expert testimony in infringement cases.  For example, in Swirsky,  
Swirsky’s expert testifies that “notes falling on the beat will be more 
prominent to the ear than notes falling off the beat,”139 and therefore that some 
notes that differed between the recordings at issue should be discounted 
because they were off the beat.  Perhaps such analysis is useful in some 
circumstances, but it should be viewed warily, because, as Aaron Keyt has 
noted, it has the same structure as Learned Hand’s abstractions test: “at each 
level of analysis, more notes are excluded as ornamental, until at the highest 
level only a short, abstract pitch structure remains.”140  It is, then, a technique 
for granting broader protection to a work, and at the highest level clearly 
represents overbroad protection.   
For present purposes, it is equally important to understand that 
musical analysis has not traditionally been used to distinguish composition 
from performance.  Indeed, it developed as a technique to analyze notated 
musical compositions, and to identify which of the notes were ornaments that 
did not contribute to the basic structure of the work, and which were more 
integrally connected with larger scale structures.  Thus, whether a particular 
feature of a musical work is “ornamental” or “structural” has nothing to do 
with whether it is composition or performance, either in the sense of whether 
it is notated or whether it is the result of deliberation.  One can easily 
spontaneously improvise a melody or chord sequences that establishes a tonal 
center, decisively moves away from it, and just as decisively moves back again. 
C. A Recap and Summary 
                                                          
139 Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d at 841. 
140 Aaron Keyt, An Improved Framework for Music Plagiarism Litigation, 76 Cal. L. 
Rev. at 437 (1988). 
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The aim of this analysis has been to cast serious doubt on the 
assumption that there is any easy way to determine which features of a 
phonorecord-embodied musical work count as “composition” and which 
count as “performance.”  At least four different approaches seem to appear in 
expert testimony and judicial discussion.  When they all point in the same 
direction, it may seem as though the distinction between composition and 
performance is solid and elemental.  Upon closer inspection, the ease and 
simplicity disappear, and the application of the tests to sound recordings seem 
inappropriate, practically impossible, or both.   
As a matter of statutory interpretation, these difficulties should lead 
to a consideration of whether the 1976 Act, in recognizing copyright in 
phonorecord-fixed musical works, by implication mandated reinterpretation 
of the provision in the Sound Recording Act of 1971 that copyright “do[es] not 
extend to the making or duplication of another sound recording that consists 
entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds.”141 That provision may 
have originally been thought to mandate recognition of a category of 
performance elements in sound recordings that would not be protected as 
part of the musical works embodied in those sound recordings.142  Yet that 
interpretation was formed at a time when only notated musical works were 
recognized as subject to copyright protection.  This Part has concluded that 
the recognition of phonorecord-fixed musical works has left us without a 
single appropriate approach to isolate composition elements from 
performance elements.       As a matter of policy, that conclusion leads to a 
more thorough consideration, in the next Part of this Article, of the merits, 
drawbacks, and practical consequences of discarding the 
composition/performance distinction. 
V. A GLIMPSE INTO THE WORLD OF THE INCLUSIVE PHONORECORD-EMBEDDED 
MUSICAL WORK: BENEFITS, DRAWBACKS, AND CONSEQUENCES 
 
What would the world of music copyright look like if we were to 
treat musical works fixed in phonorecords as extending to every aspect of 
recorded sound, thus discarding the composition/performance distinction, 
and treating such a musical work as coextensive with the sound recording?  
                                                          
141 Sound Recording Act of 1971, supra note 1, § 1(a) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1(f) (1909)). 
142 The required reinterpretation is not of the same difficulty or gravity as a repeal by 
implication.  Even if copyright in phonorecord-fixed musical works was coextensive 
with copyright in the sound recordings fixed in those phonorecords,  § 114(b) would 
still have work to do: its limitation would still apply to sound recordings that are not 
also musical works, such as recordings of ambient sounds and spoken word 
recordings. 
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This Part takes a first crack at addressing that question.  In particular, it 
considers matters of infringement analysis, authorship, and licensing.  It will 
argue that an inclusive approach to phonorecord-embedded musical works 
has potential benefits in all three of those areas.  An inclusive infringement 
analysis will better implement the traditional holding that similarity of 
musical works is to be assessed by listening, and with the reality that listening 
experiences are concrete and detailed, and that many different elements of 
those experiences can affect perceptions of aesthetic similarity.  An inclusive 
approach is also more likely to acknowledge authorship on the part of those 
who contribute a variety of different elements that give musical recordings 
aesthetic appeal.  Finally, an inclusive approach removes an obstacle to 
recognizing unified copyright in some phonorecord-embedded musical works. 
A. Inclusive Infringement Analysis 
When considering the issue of whether one musical work infringes 
another, courts have frequently noted that music is fundamentally an aural 
experience, and that one has engage in acts of listening to determine whether 
two musical works are substantially similar.   A long tradition of decisions 
recognizing that substantial similarity in music is to be judged through 
listening143 culminates in Judge Jerome Frank’s classic formulation in Arnstein 
v. Porter: “The question . . . is whether defendant took from plaintiff's works so 
much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the 
audience for whom . . . popular music is composed, that defendant wrongfully 
appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.”144   
It seems, moreover, that our identification of musical experiences as 
similar or dissimilar and as pleasing or displeasing takes into account all 
aspects of those experiences, though some may predominate in particular 
cases.  For example, an important set of experiments conducted by Prof. Jamie 
Lund suggest that listener perceptions of similarity of what she classifies as 
the “compositional elements” of melody, harmony and rhythm are significantly 
                                                          
143 See D’Almaine v. Boosey, 1 Y. & C. 288, 302  160 Eng. Rep. 117, 123 (Ex. 1835) 
(“Substantially the piracy is where the appropriated music, though adapted to a 
different purpose from that of the original, may still be recognised by the ear.”); Jollie v. 
Jaques,  13 F.Cas. 910, 914 (1850) (infringement depends upon whether “the ear detects 
the same air in the new arrangement”); Austin v. Columbia Gramophone Co. [1917-23] 
Macg. Cop. Cas. 398.  Cf. Hyperion Records v. Lionel Sawkins, [2005] 3 All ER 636 (CA) 
(“The test of substantial reproduction is not a note-by-note textual comparison of the 
scores. It involves listening to and comparing the sounds of the copyright work and of 
the infringing work.”). 
144 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946). 
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affected by varying the “performance elements” of tempo, key signature, 
orchestration and style,145 because listeners do not naturally perceive those 
elements separately, but hear the mixture of all elements as a whole.  Similarly, 
Aaron Keyt has argued that our musical perception is holistic – that, in his 
terms, “we, as musical listeners, tend not to hear merely acoustical sounds per 
se, but rather structural relations among sounds[, and a] change in any element can 
alter these structural relations.”146 Keyt uses an example similar to Lund’s 
experimental samples, in which he asks the reader to compare a passage from 
Scott Joplin’s “The Entertainer” to a passage that he himself composed (and 
titled “The Plagiarizer”).  In Keyt’s example, however, he uses much of the 
melodic line of the Joplin passage, but changes rhythm and harmony.  “No 
listener,” he asserts, “is likely to find these two musical phrases identical, nor 
even particularly similar.”147  Recall, as well, that a number of scholars have 
argued that our listening experiences of  recordings in particular are likely to 
involve aesthetically significant discoveries, not just of large-scale structures 
of tonal harmony, but also of timbres and textures, since they can emerge as 
important upon repeated relistening.  Thus, in cases alleging infringement of a 
phonorecord-embodied musical work, one should base substantial similarity 
analysis on listening to a rendering of the allegedly infringed phonorecord as a 
whole, and one should do the same in cases alleging infringement by a 
phonorecord-embodied work.   
That may sound good in principle, but in practice, how would an 
inclusive view of phonorecord-fixed musical works affect how copyright 
infringement analysis is conducted, both in the absence and presence of 
related notated musical works?  Here’s an example, drawn from the facts of 
litigation between Les Baxter and John Williams.  Baxter sued Williams and 
related parties, claiming that the main theme from the motion picture “E.T., 
the Extra-Terrestrial,” 148 composed by Williams, infringed Baxter’s song “Joy,” 
part of a suite of songs entitled “The Passions.”149 Baxter composed the suite in 
                                                          
145 See Jamie Lund, An Empirical Examination of the Lay Listener Test in Music 
Composition Copyright Infringement, 11 Va. Sports & Ent. L. J. 117, 146-147 (2011). 
146 Aaron Keyt, An Improved Framework for Music Plagiarism Litigation, 76 Cal. L. 
Rev. 421, 434 (1988) (emphasis in original). 
147 Id.  Keyt’s article only presents the two works in staff notation, but I have made 
simple rendered-midi-file recordings of his notations that are available at 
http://www.law.gwu.edu/facweb/rbrauneis/musicalworkcopyright.htm.  
148 A recording of that theme can be heard at “E.T. Movie Theme – full – HQ,” 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPhE1XZXw3s . 
149 Reported opinions in this litigation include Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, Williams v. Baxter, 484 U.S. 954 (1987); Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 907 F.2d 154 
(9th Cir. 1990). 
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1953, and released a recording of it in 1954, as performed by an orchestra he 
conducted and vocalist Bas Sheba.  Neither “Joy” nor any of the other songs 
that comprised “The Passions” were ever published in the form of scores or 
sheet music.  Thus, to obtain federal copyright protection for “Joy” as a 
musical work, Baxter’s music publisher, Beechwood Music Corp., registered it 
as an unpublished musical composition.150   The recording of “The Passions” 
released under Baxter’s name in 1954 was, as far as I have been able to tell, the 
only recording of the work ever published.151 
During the course of the litigation, the parties clashed over whether a 
synthesized version of Baxter’s score should be played to the jury, in addition 
to the 1954 recording.  Williams contended that it should be excluded.  He 
argued that Baxter had increased the articulation and relative volume of one 
sequence of notes in the synthesized version to make it more prominent and 
thus to increase the perception of similarity between “Joy” and the “E.T. 
Theme.”152  Baxter replied that the lack of articulation and low volume of the 
sequence in the 1954 recording was due to the inferior recording technology at 
the time, and that the synthesized version more accurately reflected the 
Baxter’s work – i.e., apparently, the score.153   
Consider, first, a hypothetical alteration of these facts, in which “Joy” 
had never been notated, and therefore in which the only embodiment of the 
musical work was the recording or phonorecord published in 1954.  In that 
case, under the inclusive or coextensive view of phonorecord-embodied 
musical works, it should clearly be error to submit to the jury (or to the judge 
sitting as fact-finder) a revised, synthesized version of the work in which the 
articulation and relative volume of musical lines were altered.  It is simply part 
of the musical work embedded in the recording that a particular musical line 
is in the background, indistinct, and of low volume.  Those characteristics of 
                                                          
150 See U.S. Copyright Registration Eu 347744 (February 15, 1954) (“Joy,” music by Les 
Baxter, © Beechwood Music Corp.); supra note 22 (explaining federal copyright 
protection for registered, unpublished musical works under the Copyright Act of 
1909).  Although the compositions in the suite “The Passions” were all songs, in the 
sense that they featured vocalists, the vocalists sang only nonsense syllables like “La” 
and “Aw,” and so the compositions did not include lyrics. 
151 See Les Baxter, “Les Baxter conducts his original musical composition The Passions, 
featuring Bas Sheba” (Capitol Records 1954). The recording can be heard at “Les 
Baxter – The Passions – Joy,”  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LTwUTFmGX1Q. 
152 See M. Fletcher Reynolds, “Music Analysis for Expert Testimony in Copyright 
Infringement Litigation” 190-191 (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Kansas, 1991) 
(University Microfilms, Inc. Order Number 9210107) (discussing this controversy in 
the Baxter litigation with references to the record in the case).   
153 See id. 
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that sequence of notes might well be important to a jury finding that the line 
played a minimal role in the appeal of “Joy,” and that even if John Williams 
had copied that particular sequence of notes, he had placed it in a very 
different context in the “E.T.” theme, thus rendering the works substantially 
dissimilar. 
Now consider the actual facts of the “Joy” case.  They are more 
complicated, because they involve both a notated musical work and a musical 
audio work, and thus Baxter can sue for the infringement of the notated work 
as well.  (Assume for the moment that Baxter owns copyright in both works, 
an issue we’ll consider further below.)  Of course, the notated work should be 
considered as a whole as well.  The score of “Joy” included notes that specified 
that the musical line in question was to be played “piano,” i.e., quietly, and  
that it should be played on a xylophone, with soft hammers.154    Thus, a 
synthesized performance of the score in which the musical line was played 
forte by synthetic trumpets would clearly not accurately represent the work. 
In addition, the fact that the notated musical work never had any 
independent commercial value – that scores were never published or sold155 -- 
should be taken into account in the copyright infringement case.  Thus, if a 
jury were to find infringement of the score but not the recording, Baxter 
should not able to recover any actual damages, though he presumably could 
recover statutory damages, and might conceivably be able to recover some 
portion of the profits generated by the “E.T.” theme.  The lack of commercial 
publication of the score up through the infringement litigation, over thirty 
years after the score was composed, might also on a plausible reading of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.156 be relevant to 
whether injunctive relief was available, on the theory that the failure to grant 
an injunction to Baxter might not cause him an irreparable injury, since he had 
never marketed the score nor had any plans to do so.  In any event, the 
economic center of the litigation is the recorded version of “The Passions,” 
which was released commercially, and even today is available on Compact 
Disc. The musical work embodied in that recording is different than the 
notated score, and should be considered on its own terms.157 
                                                          
154 See M. Fletcher Reynolds, supra note 133, at 190-191. 
155 There may be someone at Bax Music, Inc., “Home of the Les Baxter catalogue,” who 
would inform me that there have other sales, rentals, or public performances of the 
scores.  See http://www.baxmusic.com/. 
156 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
157 Recall that it seems to be the case that musical works fixed in phonorecords before 
the effective date of the Copyright Act of 1976 (January 1, 1978), as well as before the 
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 Three subsidiary issues may arise in connection with infringement 
cases under an inclusive view of phonorecord-embedded musical works.  Two 
of those are the important procedural issues of when summary judgment 
would be available and when expert testimony would be admitted, and I 
discuss those in an online note.158  The third is the threshold boundary issue of 
whether a particular phonorecord contains a musical work at all.  After all, 
spoken-word sound recordings and ambient sound recordings also include 
sounds with overtones and attack-sustain-decay-release envelopes, so do they 
also qualify as musical works?  Here it may be that the “melody, harmony, and 
rhythm” definition has a role to play.  A sound recording that contains no 
discernible sequences of pitches, or concurrently sounded pitches, or accented 
pulses, may not be something that we are prepared to call a musical work.  Yet 
to say that sounds without any of these aspects don’t count as music is not to 
say that only these aspects count as music.  Every pitch sounded will either 
have overtones or it won’t.  Every pitch will also either start suddenly, remain 
absolutely uniform throughout its duration, and end just as suddenly, or it 
will change in various ways as it sounds.  Either way, such characteristics are 
important to our experience of music, just as the pitch itself is, and they have 
become even more important in the age of recorded music. 
B. Authorship, Ownership and Public Performance Rights 
 What implications would an inclusive view of musical audio works 
have for issues of authorship and ownership?  One might think that the 
implications would be drastic, yet given current copyright law provisions 
concerning joint authorship and compulsory licensing, they would seem to be 
relatively modest for existing recordings, and would open up more room for 
bargaining with regard to future initial recordings. 
 1.  Joint Authorship 
                                                                                                                                            
effective date of the Sound Recording Act of 1971 (February 15, 1972) are now eligible 
for copyright.  See supra note 95.  The Baxter court holds that Baxter’s claim rests solely 
on his registered sheet music, since the sound recording was made before federal 
copyright law protection extended to sound recordings. See Baxter v. MCA, 812 F.2d at 
422 n. 1. This statement may reflect the Ninth Circuit rule at the time of this decision 
that sound recordings effected a divestive publication of the musical works contained 
in them.  However, Congress legislatively overturned that rule, see supra note 23, and 
hence the musical work embedded in the 1954 sound recording of “Joy” is eligible for 
copyright. 
158 See 
http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/rbrauneis/musicalworkcopyright/summaryjudgment
experttestimony.htm. 
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The song “Good Vibrations,” released as a single in 1966 by the Beach 
Boys, is credited in the BMI repertoire to Brian Wilson and Mike Love.   
According to Philip Lambert, Wilson did not compose the song as a Tin Pan 
Alley songwriter would have, conceiving of the final product as sheet music 
that would be sold to be performed by others.  Rather, from the beginning, he 
conceived of “Good Vibrations” as an audio work, and worked for months on 
creating just the sequence of sounds he wanted.  He approached more than 
one person about writing words for the song, but among them was Mike Love, 
whose words became part of the song in its canonical recorded version.  
Wilson also used about twenty musicians to record various performances in 
four different recording studios. The result was 90 hours of sound on magnetic 
tape, which Wilson edited and mixed to create the final three minute and 
thirty-five second record.159  Whether we use the “double intent” test of the 
Second and Seventh Circuits,160 or the “control” or “superintendence” test of 
the Ninth Circuit,161 it seems clear that not all twenty musicians were joint 
authors of the song as an inclusive audio work, even if they all made musically 
significant contributions to it.  Yet under either of those tests, it is quite likely 
that Wilson and Love would be found to be joint authors, since Wilson 
apparently ceded control over the lyrics to Love, and they both intended to 
merge their contributions into a single work.  Thus, an inclusive view of 
musical audio works would often not change determinations of authorship. 
Sometimes, however, it would.  Consider, for example, the creation of 
“The Reasons Why,” the work that was allegedly infringed by Usher 
Raymond’s “Burn” in Straughter v. Raymond.162  Given the facts related by Judge 
Snyder in her opinion in that case, it seems likely that the song was never 
fixed in notated or recorded form before it was recorded by the band “Reel 
Tight.”  The first fixation, in a sound recording, was probably assembled over 
hours or days of experimentation by the four band members and six others 
who are credited for various contributions to the recording, including plaintiff 
Ernest Straughter, who was not a band member but was in the studio with 
the band during a recording session.163  The only published version of that 
                                                          
159 See Philip Lambert, Inside the Music of Brian Wilson: The Songs, Sounds, and 
Influences of the Beach Boys’ Founding Genius (2007). 
160 See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500; Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 
1994); Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998). 
161 See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.ed 1227 (9th Cir. 2000). 
162 2011 WL 3651350 (C.D. Cal.). 
163 See Straughter, 2011 WL 3651350 at *1 (“Plaintiff claims that he began composing a 
song entitled “The Reasons Why” (“Reasons”) in March or April 1998, and completed 
it in May 1998, during a break in one of his sessions with Reel Tight. . . . According to 
plaintiff, when the members of Reel Tight returned to the studio from the break, they 
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sound recording was released on Reel Tight’s album “Back to the Real” under 
the title “No More Pain,” and the album notes gave authorship credit for the 
song to all four band members, Straughter, and his brother David 
Straughter.164  Documents uncovered during litigation showed that Straughter 
has accepted a 13% ownership interest in the song.165  Some months before the 
release of “Back to the Reel,” Straughter registered a claim of copyright in “The 
Reasons Why” as an unpublished musical work, listing himself and his 
brother David as authors.166  The deposit accompanying the registration was a 
sound recording that apparently featured the creative contributions of all 
credited on the “Back to the Real” pamphlet – a recording was nearly identical 
to the version released on “Back to the Real.”   
Suppose that all band members agreed that Ernest and David 
Straughter had come up with the words and the basic melody for the song.  
Nonetheless, under the inclusive view of musical audio works, a court could 
be justified in finding that all band members were joint authors of the song in 
its only fixed form, as a phonorecord-fixed musical work.167  As words and a 
melody settled only in the minds of the Straughters, that work was hardly 
complete. The Reel Tight band members contributed harmonies, rhythms, 
vocal embellishments, and instrument timbres, and may well have determined 
the structure of the song (added an intro, a bridge, and an outro, and 
determined the number of times the melody would be repeated), and even 
modified the words and melody.  The credit on the album notes, and the 13% 
                                                                                                                                            
heard him playing “Reasons” and wanted to record it, which they did.”); Reel Tight, 
“Back to the Real” (1999) (those credited for “No More Pain” in the CD booklet 
include “Produced by: Reel Tight • Co-Produced by: Ernest Straughter & David 
Straughter for Khamillion Entertainment •  Written by: Bobby Torrence, Reginald 
Long, Danny Johnson, Robert Rice, Ernest Straughter, David Straughter •Arranged 
by: Reel Tight & Ernest Straughter for Khamillion Entertainment •Keyboards and 
Programming: Ernest Straugher •Drums & Percussion: Bobby Torrence •Drum 
Programming: David Straughter •Acoustic & Electric Guitar: James T. Macon •Bass: 
Bobby Watson •Engineered by Charles Nassar . . .•Mixed by: Craig Burbidge”) 
164 See supra note 157 for the credits for “No More Pain.” 
165 Straughter, 2011 WL 3651350 at *4. 
166 See Straughter, 2011 WL 3651350 at *2.  Ernest Straughter later asserted that he was 
the sole author of the song, and had only included his brother as a “goodwill gesture.”  
See id.   
167  For an English case that concluded, on somewhat similar facts, that authorship 
should be attributed to a single composer, see Hadley v. Kemp, [1999] EMLR 569.  For 
critical reviews of this case, see Lionel Bently, Authorship of popular music in UK 
copyright law, 12 Information, Communication & Society 179. 190-192 (2009); Anne 
Barron, Introduction: Harmony or Dissonance? Copyright Concepts and Musical 
Practice, 15 Social & Legal Studies 25, 26-30 (2006). 
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ownership interest assigned to Ernest Straughter, which he apparently 
accepted, are objective evidence of the intent of all involved to treat each other 
as co-owners.  The authorship of “The Reasons Why” was only marginally at 
issue in Straughter v. Raymond; if the issue were more directly litigated, more 
evidence that affected a determination of authorship might emerge.  The point 
here is that in principle, the authors of words and a melody might be found to 
share co-authorship of a musical audio work with others who contributed to 
it and who met the applicable joint authorship tests.168    
 2. The Mechanical License. 
 Since 1909, virtually all “cover versions” of musical works – recordings 
made after the initial publicly distributed recording – have been made under 
the statutory license in § 1(e) of the 1909 Act or § 115 of the 1976 Act, or under 
a license issued by the Harry Fox Agency that incorporates the terms of that 
statutory license.  Section 115(b) of the 1976 Act explicitly provides that a 
statutory licensee can make an arrangement of the licensed musical work 
when recording it, but that the arrangement “shall not be subject to 
protection as a derivative work under this title, except with the express 
consent of the copyright owner.”169  Note that this provision contemplates 
that at least some of what is added to a preexisting musical work when it is 
recorded could amount to a copyrightable “arrangement,” and not just 
uncopyrightable “performance.”  In any event, however, it denies copyright 
protection to that arrangement unless the copyright owner expressly 
consents, something that in practice does not occur.   
Under an inclusive view of musical audio works, the § 115(b) default 
provision would act to deny copyright protection to every phonorecord-fixed 
musical work that was derivative of an earlier work and made under a 
statutory license of that earlier work.  In other words, when Adele records a 
                                                          
168 U.S. courts may be hesitant to assign unequal interests in the absence of agreement 
due to their lack of confidence in their aesthetic judgment.  See Benjamin E. Jaffe, 
Rebutting the Equality Principle, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1549 (2011) (arguing that courts 
should recognize unequal contributions to copyrighted works).  However, they might 
at least consider agreements to assign unequal shares, such as the agreement 
mentioned in Straughter v. Raymond concerning the ownership of “The Reasons Why” 
(or “No More Pain” in its released version), as evidence of the creators’ own 
assessment of relative contributions, especially if the unequal distributions seem to 
have some parallel in the importance of the author’s contributions to the finished 
work.  Such an approach might facilitate findings of joint authorship within musical 
practices that clearly seem collaborative.   
169 17 U.S.C. § 115(b). 
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version of Bob Dylan’s “Make You Feel My Love,”170 she creates under the 
inclusive view of musical works what otherwise would be a copyrightable 
derivative work.  However, since that recording was almost certainly made 
under a Harry Fox license, neither she nor anyone else who contributed to 
that recording owns copyright in the musical work embedded in it.  That 
means that when Adele’s recording is publicly performed, no one has to pay 
Adele or her assignee for public performance of the derivative musical work 
she created.171  The legal situation should be the same for cover recordings 
made under the 1909 Act.172  The advantage of that lack of copyright is that the 
recognition of musical audio works would upset fewer settled expectations; 
the disadvantage is that that recognition would do little for those who make 
creative contributions to recordings made under the compulsory mechanical 
license. 
3. Initial Recordings.   
That leaves the copyright status of initial recordings of musical works, 
which are not made under a statutory license.  Musical works born as musical 
sound recordings do not present any particular problems.  Authorship and 
initial ownership of such works would be determined by the rules of joint and 
sole authorship covered above; the statutory license under § 115 would grant 
permission to use such works for the purpose of making cover recordings, 
including permission to imitate any aspect of sound in the recording.  
Suppose, however, that in a traditional songwriter-recording artist 
arrangement, a songwriter produces a notated musical work, and grants a 
voluntary license to a recording artist to make an initial recording of that 
work.  If the recording is considered to be a copyright-protected musical 
audio work, and not just a sound recording, could a recording artist then be 
owed royalties for the public performance of her recording of a notated song, 
in addition to the public performance royalties owed to the notated song’s 
composer?   
Given traditional contracting practices working against the 
background of § 103(a) the 1976 Act and §6 of the 1909 Act, most musical 
audio works that are initial recordings of notated works are not under 
                                                          
170 For the Adele version, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fnn9JlqqTE4.  
171 Of course, when the recording is performed as a digital audio transmission, the 
owner of copyright in the sound recording may have to give permission or be 
compensated. See 17 U.S.C. §§  106(6), 114(d). 
172 See the online note at 
http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/rbrauneis/musicalworkcopyright/1909actcompulsor
ylicense.htm. 
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copyright.  It has long been accepted that permission to make a recording of a 
notated song does not necessarily include permission to create a derivative 
work.  Thus, the §115(b) provision denying copyright in arrangements 
produced under compulsory license without specific permission is a specific 
application of the more general provisions in §103(a) of the 1976 Act and  §6 of 
the 1909 Act that deny copyright to any derivative work produced without 
permission. The issue of whether derivative musical works could gain 
copyright protection would have arisen under the 1909 Act as well.  In the 
course of preparing a recording of a notated song, a recording artist might well 
notate a complex orchestral arrangement, and add sections to the song – an 
introduction, a bridge, a closing section – that did not exist in the notated 
work that she licensed.  Apparently, the tradition has been for owners of 
copyright in notated songs to withhold permission to create such works from 
creators of initial recordings.173  To be sure, contracting parties in the music 
industry were very unlikely to have been thinking about the precise issue 
posed here, because musical works fixed only in phonorecords before 1978 
were not subject to copyright protection, and the inclusive view of musical 
works advocated in the article was probably not within their imagination.  
Nonetheless, the fact that they almost always withheld permission to publish 
derivative musical arrangements provides good grounds for a presumption 
that they would not have permitted recording artists to claim derivative work 
copyright in musical audio works.174 
 The ability for songwriters and recording artists to bargain openly 
about public performance rights in initial recordings could have the advantage 
of greatly diminishing the apparently widespread practice of granting 
songwriting credit to recording artists.  At least since the days of Al Jolson, 
recording artists have bargained for and received credit for co-writing notated 
works that they actually played no part in composing.175  This practice is 
                                                          
173 It is very difficult to find copies of licenses to make initial recordings – they are 
generally not recorded at the Copyright Office, and are kept in private company 
archives.  M. William Krasilovsky and Sydney Shemel state that “[t]he author of an 
arrangement cannot claim a derivative copyright in the arrangement without the 
consent of the copyright owner. Such consents are rarely given.” M. William 
Krasilovsky and Sydney Shemel, This Business of Music 154 (9th ed. 2003).  However, 
in context, this statement appears to be about compulsory licenses under § 115, not 
about initial recording licenses. 
174 The use of § 103(a), not to deny copyright to infringing strangers, but to allow an 
owner of copyright to deny copyright to derivative works created within a 
contracting relationship, deserves further scrutiny, and perhaps abolition, but that 
topic is not within the scope of this article. 
175 See Geoffrey P. Hull, Termination Rights and the Real Songwriters, 7 Vanderbilt J. of 
Ent. & Tech. Law 301, 301 (2005). 
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evidence that what recording artists add to a notated song is so important to 
the success of the recording that songwriters are willing to give recording 
artists part of the streams of public performance  and mechanical income that 
accrue only to composers.  Though it is rarely acknowledged, the practice 
apparently continues to be widespread among top recording artists.  For 
example, in an interview that was later removed from the website on which it 
was originally published, but is still quoted on third-party websites, 
songwriter Heather Bright claimed that Justin Bieber played no part in 
writing the song “Somebody to Love,” for which he is credited and receives 
publishing income,176 and that other recording artists such as Rihanna and 
Kanye West bargained for and received credit for songs that they did not 
write.177 
 It if were acknowledged that musical audio works could be 
authorized derivatives of notated musical works deserving of public 
performance income, Justin Bieber could receive permission to create and be 
recognized as co-author of the musical audio work “Somebody to Love,” and 
legitimately receive income from public performances of that work, without 
being falsely credited for co-authoring the notated work. 
C. Looking Towards the Future: 
 Unitary Copyright in Musical Audio Works? 
So far, this Article has paid little attention to the copyright in sound 
recordings that exists parallel to and concurrently with the copyright that 
may be recognized in musical works embedded in those sound recordings.  
However, the relationship between those two layers of copyright deserves 
                                                          
176 In the BMI repertoire database, the song, listed as BMI Work #11610494, is credited 
to Justin Bieber, Heather Dawn Bright, Jeremy L. Reeves, Ray Romulus, and Jonathan 
James Yip.  See BMI Repertoire, http://repertoire.bmi.com/startpage.asp (search for 
“Somebody to Love”). It is unclear whether Heather Bright was claiming sole 
authorship of the notated song, or whether she would recognize some of the other 
listed songwriters as co-authors. 
177 See The Prophet Blog, “Hit Songwriter Heather Bright Exposes Top Pop Stars for 
Faking Writing Credits,” http://www.theprophetblog.net/hit-songwriter-heather-
bright-exposes-top-pop-stars-for-faking-writing-credits/; Carter Maness, 
“Songwriter Blasts Rihanna, Kanye Over Song Publishing,” The Boombox, April 6, 
2011, http://www.theboombox.com/2011/04/06/songwriter-blasts-rihanna-kanye-
over-song-publishing/ .  For other anecdotes about recording artists receiving credit 
for songs they did not write, see Peter Cooper, “On Music Row, is the Co-Write 
King?,” http://blogs.tennessean.com/tunein/2010/03/19/on-music-row-is-the-co-write-
king/ ; Occasional Hope, “When is a Singer-Songwriter Not Really a Singer-
Songwriter?,” http://mykindofcountry.wordpress.com/2010/03/26/when-is-a-singer-
songwriter-not-really-a-singer-songwriter/   
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some scrutiny.  Before the Copyright Act of 1976, the dominant explanation of 
their relationship drew on the composition/performance distinction.  Musical 
compositions were works of written notation, and thus copyright in musical 
compositions covered what was expressed in that notation.  Sound 
recordings, when they concerned music at all, captured performances of 
notated musical works.  Copyright in a musical composition was almost 
always owned by a different entity than copyright in a sound recording of that 
musical composition. If, however, the 1976 Act were to be read as recognizing 
inclusive musical work copyright in a musical audio work, which included 
every element of sound fixed in a phonorecord, why would it make sense to 
continue to recognize separate sound recording copyright for the same sounds 
fixed in the same phonorecord? 
One possible source of distinction is suggested by the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films,178 which holds that the act of 
sampling a sound recording in another sound recording is always copyright 
infringement, or in other words, that there is no de minimis exception or 
substantial similarity analysis in sampling cases.179  If we were to adopt that 
rule, we could say that sound recording and musical work rights are 
distinguished by mode of copying.  Sound recording rights are special rights 
concerning copying by electronic or mechanical processes such as sampling or 
dubbing, and are absolute bans on the use of such means.  By contrast, musical 
work rights are rights against the creation of substantially similar works by 
any form of copying, whether electronic, mechanical, or through imitation.  A 
full evaluation of the Bridgeport Music rule is not within the scope of this article, 
but suffice it to say that the rule is controversial.  No court outside of the 
Sixth Circuit has adopted it, and one Eleventh Circuit District Court has 
specifically rejected it.180  If the rule is ultimately rejected, then we are again 
faced with the question of why a musical audio work should necessarily be 
subject to intrinsically divided copyright. 
Though it may be difficult to think beyond traditional categories, in 
which we always speak of the “underlying musical work” as separate from the 
particular sound recording of that work, consider how unitary copyright is 
possible in audiovisual works, which join even more complex and disparate 
audible and visible elements.  Putting aside the frequent use of the “works 
made for hire” provisions in the motion picture industry, which may obscure 
                                                          
178 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). 
179 See id. at 800-801. 
180 See Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp.2d 1325, 1339-1341 (S.D. Fla. 2009), 
affirmed on other grounds, 635 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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the analogy, consider a smaller-scale audiovisual project, in which four or five 
people decide to create a video.  They agree in advance that their 
contributions will be merged together in a joint work, and that they will treat 
each other as joint authors.  After they come to that agreement, one person 
writes some dialogue; another creates a set; a third appears as an actor; a 
fourth decides on camera angles and operates the camera.   
The result of these varied contributions, the video, is covered by a 
single unitary audiovisual work copyright.  We do not say that copyright in 
every motion picture must necessarily consist of an “underlying dramatic 
work” and an “audiovisual recording” based on that work.  Of course, maybe 
we would be saying that if various copyright industries had successfully 
lobbied for different copyright law provisions.  Suppose, for example, that 
dramatic publishers had joined with movie theater owners and television 
broadcasters to convince Congress to deny audiovisual works a public 
performance right.  Perhaps the dramatic publishers would then be collecting 
fees for the public performance of an “underlying dramatic work” every time a 
movie was shown, and they would share that revenue with those identified as 
authors of that underlying dramatic work, but not with those who were 
identified merely as authors of the “audiovisual recording.”  Yet since that did 
not happen, we are not accustomed to dividing up motion pictures in that 
way, and it does not seem to us that there is anything in the nature of motion 
pictures that requires such a division. 
The advantages of unitary copyright in works of authorship seem 
obvious.  Although in some cases a work of authorship will be a derivative 
work, requiring two different licenses to use the work, in many cases it will 
not, and only one license will be needed.  The savings in the transaction costs 
of bargaining for licenses should be substantial, as should the savings in the 
costs of maintaining two separate companies or associations to collect and 
distribute revenues to authors.  To be sure, recognition of unitary copyright in 
musical audio works would necessitate a major realignment in the current 
dual industry structure of music publishing and recording, but that is not a 
reason to deny such recognition, unless one is approaching the issue from the 
perspective of an established member of one of those industries that is afraid 
of losing out in such a realignment. 
Our lingering sense that all musical works have an essence 
independent of particular sound recordings of them may stem from the 
dominance of the model of literary works in copyright.  Written language may 
not have gained complete independence from spoken language, but it has 
gained a great deal of independence.  In the fourth century, St. Augustine was 
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amazed to see St. Ambrose reading silently, without pronouncing the words 
aloud.181  These days, silent reading is a common practice, and we can learn 
new words and their meanings without knowing how they are pronounced – 
not only are we not speaking aloud while reading, but we are not pronouncing 
the words to ourselves either.  Because of that large degree of independence of 
written language from sound, it is relatively easy for us to conceive of literary 
works as independent of spoken performances of them. 
Music has never gained the same degree of independence from sound.  
Even those who have developed the skill of sight-reading music to such an 
extent that they can read scores silently and “understand” them are engaging 
in an act of aural imagination, imagining what a performance of the score 
would sound like.  They are not experiencing the “meaning” of the notes 
independently of any sound associated with them.   
It is true, of course, that many songs originally conceived of and 
constructed as recordings have been covered by other artists.  One might 
think that the existence of such covers is proof that the musical work has a life 
separate from the recording, and that by experiencing many such recordings 
and discarding the differences between them, we are able to arrive at a 
conception of the true musical work that underlies them all.  Yet in truth 
there may just be a cluster of recordings that bear “family resemblances”182 to 
each other, rather than a single, determinate, independent musical work that 
underlies them all, yet consists of only some subset of characteristics of the 
first recording, and not the sound in all its complexity. 
Consider, for example, Queen’s song “Bohemian Rhapsody.”183 At 
about one minute and twenty seconds into that musical audio work, Freddie 
Mercury sings the line “But now I’ve gone and thrown it all away.”  When 
singing “all away,” he changes to a much rougher voice, and the drums enter 
with a cymbal crash – a change in sound texture.  When Jake Shimabukuro 
covers “Bohemian Rhapsody” on ukulele, his rendering contains a definite 
trace of that textural change; he strums the ukulele energetically, rather than 
                                                          
181 See The Confessions of St. Augustine Book VI (translated by E.B. Pusey; Chatto and 
Windus edition 1921, etext prepared by Robert S. Munday), available at 
http://archive.org/stream/theconfessionsof03296gut/tcosa10.txt (“But when 
[Ambrose] was reading, his eye glided over the pages, and his heart searched out the 
sense, but his voice and tongue were at rest.”) 
182 I borrow this term from Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations § 67. 
183 Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fJ9rUzIMcZQ 
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picking it delicately as he previously had been doing.184   In an a cappella 
recording by the UC Men’s Octet, the lead singer sings with more pronounced 
vibrato then previously, and the accompanying singers switch from a covered 
“oo” to an open “aa, and back to “oo.”185 In the recording that Jonathan Groff 
makes with the cast of “Glee,” the change of vocal texture moves earlier, to the 
word “Now” at the beginning of the line;186 that’s also true of in the bluegrass 
semi-spoof version recorded by Hayseed Dixie.187  Adam Lambert, singing the 
song at an “American Idol” audition, decides to change texture and increase 
intensity even earlier, on the previous line “Life has just begun.”188  The point 
here is that it is virtually certain that all of these cover artists are familiar with 
the Queen recording, not a notated version, and are responding to and 
imitating features that appear in that recording, and sometimes modifying 
them.  What we end up with is a cluster of similar musical audio works.  
V. CONCLUSION 
This article has argued that copyright law should approach issues of 
infringement analysis and authorship of musical works fixed in phonorecords 
without distinguishing between composition and performance elements.  
That distinction stems from a pre-sound-recording era in which musical 
works could be fixed only in scores, and performances were considered to be 
evanescent interpretations of those scores.  Courts that depend upon such a 
distinction when analyzing musical audio recordings inconsistently apply 
four different approaches, none of which is particularly easy to apply or 
particularly  appropriate. Approaching musical sound recordings without the 
composition/performance distinction could have three major advantages.  
First, such an approach would be more consistent with the basic 
understanding that substantial similarity in music is to be evaluated through 
the comparative aesthetic appeal of listening experiences. Second, it would 
help to enable creators of all aspects of those listening experiences to enjoy the 
incentives and benefits of authorship.  Third, it could be a step towards 
recognition of unitary copyright in some musical audio works.    
                                                          
184 Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PB3RbO7updc (the passage 
discussed in the text appears at about 2:20 – 2:24). 
185 Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UyqpjkCwEI4 (the passage 
discussed appears at about 1:30 – 1:38).  
186 Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VQHtAxluxnQ&feature=fvsr (the 
passage discussed appears at about 1:15 – 1:20).  
187 Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sAWl5peI8HY (the passage 
discussed appears at about 0:42 – 0:46).  
188 Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G9k1VkwYkOk  
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